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ABSTRACT 
One of the most immediately compelling arguments against the disjunctivist position 
within the philosophy of perception points to the well-accepted fact that hallucinations 
can have the same neural cause as veridical perceptions; this is known as the causal 
argument. Since the main motivation for disjunctivism is to preserve naive realism, 
critics claim that naive realism is then incompatible with certain, well-accepted claims 
of neuropsychology, and, thus, disjunctivism is false. After surveying the general 
arguments for disjunctivism offered by Hinton, Snowden, and Martin, the causal 
argument is split into a stronger version and a weaker version. The strong argument 
relies on a narrow conception of the ‘same cause, same effect’ principle and this narrow 
conception is extremely controversial, ultimately entailing that mental events supervene 
only on the total brain state of an individual. The weak argument, which embraces a 
wider conception of the ‘same cause, same effect’ principle finds the disjunctivist 
position explanatorily redundant. The two major camps within disjunctivism, positive 
disjunctivism and negative disjunctivism, offer different approaches to the weak 
argument, and what emerges from the discussion of these two theories is that negative 
disjunctivism has a major dialectical advantage against positive disjunctivism, and that 
negative disjunctivism offers a satisfying response to the weak causal argument.  
M. G. F. Martin offers an insightful analysis of ‘indistinguishability’ and in doing so 
clarifies the disjunctivist thesis, sets limits to our understanding of our own mental 
states, and places the burden with the common-kind theorist. 
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CHAPTER I 
The fact that there are numerous theories offered within the philosophy of perception is, 
in its own way, truly remarkable. When I sit back and reflect on my awareness of the world, it 
seems obvious, at least initially, that what I am aware of is conspicuously simple: the world 
itself. The answer to such a question is unmistakeable even for a child. What they are aware of 
could be their family members, a particular building or specific cloud, or a particularly intriguing 
creepy-crawly. That is, what they are aware of in their experience is simply those everyday 
objects that we encounter; perhaps leaving space for something a little more exotic should we 
ever encounter unfamiliar objects. This view is referred to as naive realism. Naive realism is the 
philosophical theory that states that the properties that objects possess, as perceived by a subject, 
are actual properties of the objects;
1
 the finish is smooth, the water is cool, the penny is round, 
etc. Furthermore, the objects of perception appear to have the properties they do in virtue of 
possessing those properties. That is, one is directly aware of external objects, as such. 
 It may then be surprising to someone stumbling upon philosophy for the first time that a 
great many philosophers find this account unconvincing. These philosophers state that what we 
are aware of in experience is, strictly speaking, not the world. Rather, ‘experience’ is an 
intermediary between us and the world; what we are acquainted with in perception consists of a 
type of ‘mental’ object. Imagine looking at a stick partially submerged in water. To the perceiver 
the stick will appear bent, despite the fact that our perceiver knows perfectly well that sticks 
generally maintain their spatial dimensions when submerged. How then does the stick appear 
bent without actually being so? The traditional answer to such a question is that one is not aware 
                                                          
1
 Alex Byrne & Heather Logue, “Introduction” in Disjunctivism, ed. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (London, The MIT 
Press, 2009), xix. This anthology served as the main source of research. 
 2 
 
of ‘the stick’ in the first place, rather the direct objects of our experience are intra-mental objects; 
a common-kind that is ‘observed’ both when one is veridically perceiving and when one 
encounters an illusion or hallucination. The reason the stick appears bent is because we do not 
directly perceive the stick, but instead perceive a mental object; we are only ever indirectly 
aware of the external objects of the world. It is for these reasons that David Hume states that 
“this universal and primary opinion of all men [naive realism] is soon destroyed by the slightest 
philosophy,”2 and, hence, naive realism is incorrect. 
 However, in the post-Wittgenstein environment of the late 1960’s, philosophers more 
forcibly argued that subjects are, more or less, directly aware of their environment. One such 
philosopher, J.M. Hinton, offered a novel, alternative account within the philosophy of 
perception.
3
 Finding inspiration within Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and the 
ordinary-language tradition,
4
 Hinton denied that there is a common-kind shared in veridical 
perception and hallucination. Since there is no common-kind, there is no need to posit that what I 
am aware of in experience is anything but the objects of experience themselves. Having 
introduced the use of disjunctive reports (reports of the form AvB) to describe our experiences, 
this view came to be known as disjunctivism. Disjunctivism is the philosophical theory that holds 
that veridical perception and hallucinations are experiences of fundamentally different kinds.
5
 A 
disjunctive report is a disjunctive statement that replaces non-disjunctive ‘seems’ statements.6 
After Hinton’s original formulation, the view was championed both by Paul Snowden and John 
                                                          
2
 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975), 152. 
3
 Byrne & Logue, ii. 
4
 J.L. Austin’s Sense and Sensbilia bears many similarities to disjunctivism, and for this reason Austin is often given 
the honorary title of being ‘the forerunner to disjunctivism’. 
5
 William Fish, “Disjunctivism and Non-Disjunctivism: Making Sense of the Debate” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 105 (2005): 124. 
6
 Ibid., 120. 
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McDowell, who brought disjunctivism to the fore.
7
 Since this emergence, the strategy 
implemented by the disjunctivist has spread far beyond the philosophy of perception, and has 
been utilized in epistemology and metaethics. Within the philosophy of perception, disjunctivism 
has been primarily motivated by the desire to save naive realism. If we have no reason to assert 
that there truly is a common-kind, then a great host of arguments against naive realism lose their 
clout. 
 Some philosophers argue that naive realism is entirely compatible with certain 
conceptions of the common-kind, and so the crusade waged by disjunctivism is ultimately 
mistaken.
8
 Putting this criticism aside for the moment, there are two main intersecting lines of 
argument that are levelled against the disjunctive position. First, it seems patently true that a 
subject would not be able to distinguish between an instance of veridical perception and a perfect 
hallucination. Since the veridical perception and the perfect hallucination are indistinguishable, 
they must have a common-kind, this thought perhaps being justified by Leibniz’s Law. I do not 
believe that this objection is particularly convincing for reasons that will be apparent by the end 
of this thesis. However, it is important to keep this argument—the argument from 
indistinguishability—in mind.  
The second objection to disjunctivism manifests itself as the causal argument. The 
general idea is simply that veridical perception and a perfect hallucination share the same 
proximate cause. Since veridical perception and a perfect hallucination share the same proximate 
cause, veridical perception and a perfect hallucination must be the same type of thing. This thing 
                                                          
7
 However, as many scholars have noted, it is perhaps better to talk of disjunctive theories of perception, as the 
different philosophical accounts found in the literature have substantial differences. McDowell helped start the 
dialogue with "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge" Proceedings of the British Academy 68; 1982 and Snowden 
with "Perception, Vision, and Causation" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81; 1981. 
8
 The explicit argument for the incompatibility between naïve realism and the common-kind assumption will be 
outlined in the first chapter. 
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is rightfully identified as the common-kind between veridical perception and a perfect illusion, 
the existence of which disjunctivism explicitly denies. 
It is this argument which I take to be the most compelling argument against the 
disjunctivist, and I imagine that the majority of contemporary philosophers would agree with this 
evaluation. Philosophers generally wish to take the demands of scientific inquiry seriously, and if 
neuropsychological research suggests that hallucinations have the same proximate causes as 
veridical perceptions, it is wise to inquire if this scientific fact entails any commitments to a 
common-kind. If we are committed to the existence of a common-kind, it seems we lose any 
possibility for the truth of naive realism. As a philosopher interested in the possibility of naive 
realism, it would be a near fatal blow to concede that one’s philosophical theory contradicts 
purported neuropsychological facts. 
In this thesis, it is my intention to evaluate the strength of the causal argument and the 
numerous disjunctivist responses to this criticism. My second chapter will describe and enlarge 
the causal argument, dividing the main argument into two sub-arguments: the strong-causal 
argument and the weak-causal argument. After having dismissed the strong-causal argument in 
chapter two, this will be followed in the third chapter with a thorough evaluation of the responses 
offered by disjunctivists. By describing a novel conception of ‘indistinguishability’, the negative 
disjunctivist is in the best position to refute the weak-causal argument, effectively removing the 
threat of the causal argument. However, before we begin our evaluation of the general 
disjunctivist position, our foremost goal is to present a faithful account of the position, and this 
will be the goal of the first chapter. 
 After giving a brief sketch of the common-kind tradition, I will start with J.M. Hinton’s 
original formulation of the doctrine and the three main arguments for disjunctivism will be 
 5 
 
offered. Of these arguments, the first is that disjunctivism is the default position within the 
philosophy of perception, followed with Hinton’s list of requirements for philosophers who wish 
to justify a non-disjunctivist account. Since, so Hinton states, such requirements are unlikely to 
be satisfied, the disjunctivist account is correct. Secondly, Paul Snowden’s stance on the causal 
theory of perception will be discussed. The third argument for disjunctivism, formulated by 
M.G.F. Martin, concludes that if naive realism is true then disjunctivism is necessarily true. By 
synthesizing these three positions, we will hopefully be able to develop a challenge to the 
opponent of disjunctivism.   
 With these main arguments laid out, it will then be possible to foray into the intra-
disjunctivist disputes. These disagreements revolve around two central questions, the first being 
a question of how we are to characterize the disjuncts of disjunctivism. Are illusions more akin 
to veridical perception or to hallucinations? If they belong with the former, illusions are placed 
on the left-side of the disjunct (an experience is either a veridical perception/illusion or a 
hallucination),
9
 and if they are better characterized as belonging with the latter, illusions are 
placed on the right-side of the disjunct (VvI/H). The second major disagreement amongst 
disjunctivists consists in how one ought to characterize non-veridical perception,
10
 or, more 
precisely, whether it is possible to positively characterize cases of non-veridical perception. A 
negative disjunctivist characterizes the bad cases solely by what they are not; they lack those 
features possessed by veridical perception. The positive disjunctivist, being more ambitious, 
attempts to offer some type of characterization that extends beyond mere negative descriptions, 
                                                          
9
 Henceforth disjunctions will be represented as (V/IvH) and (VvI/H), where the former includes illusions with 
veridical perception and the latter includes illusions with hallucinations. 
10
 I may refer to non-veridical perception as a) the bad case or b) the right disjunct, as it is placed to the right of 
veridical perception within the disjunction. 
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such as by appealing to the so-called Theory of Appearing, according to which hallucinations are 
a type of relation
11
. 
1.1 The Argument from Illusion and the Common-Kind 
 Reports of our experience occupy a special role in the history of philosophical thought, 
and at times, have played vital roles within certain epistemological doctrines. The significance 
they held was due, in large part, to their claim of being infallible: we cannot doubt that we are 
having an experience of the type which we are experiencing. While still surrounded by 
uncertainty near the beginning of the Meditations, Descartes states that our experiences possess 
this characteristic of ‘certainty’ despite being scrutinized through methodological scepticism.12 
Although I may doubt that the world corresponds with my experiences, I cannot doubt that I am 
undergoing these experiences. In order to set out the motivation for non-disjunctive accounts, 
consider the following example. After my physician prescribes a new type of medication for me, 
I find that upon taking it I begin to ‘see’ bright lights cropping up in my field of vision, where 
my field of vision is simply what is visible to me on any given occasion. Given that my 
prescription states that ‘seeing’ bright lights may be a side-effect of my medication, I may be 
sceptical about whether there really are these bright lights that I am prone to seeing. However, I 
am sure of something, namely that I am undergoing the experience of ‘seeing’ bright-lights. I 
see, in a secondary sense,
13
 the bright lights, but they may not be real. Beliefs such as, “I am 
undergoing the experience of ‘seeing bright-lights’,” are special instances of self-reports, which 
help foundational epistemologies get started. 
                                                          
11
 Harold Langsam, “The Theory of Appearing Defended” in Disjunctivism, ed. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue, 
(London, The MIT Press, 2009), 191. 
12
 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 20. 
13
 It is helpful to remember that ‘seeing bright-lights’ can be characterized as seeing headlights or as experiencing a 
phosphene. The point at the outset is that, to the subject at a particular time, one is unable to distinguish whether 
what one is experiencing is veridical or not. 
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 The question then is asked, “What are these self-reports reports of? What am I aware of 
in these situations that provide the grounds to such a claim?” Historically, the preferred answer 
has been sense-data; the private, intra-mental, immediate objects of awareness.
14
 It is sense-data 
which ground these self-reports, as their immediacy and transparency allow us to be certain of 
their properties and attributes. Whether or not sense-data correspond to non-psychological 
realities, how bright they appear, and for what duration they appear, and this is because sense-
data are immediate and transparent. I cannot be fooled through misremembering or otherwise 
mistake the appearance. 
 Although we may be prepared to accept that we are aware of something along the lines of 
sense-data when we are experiencing the bad case (cases where we are dealing with 
hallucinations or Cartesian evil-demons), the sense-data theorist also maintains that we are aware 
of sense-data in veridical perception. Although this may seem strange, it has been a popular 
position in the history of philosophy, and has largely been motivated by the Argument from 
Illusion. The Argument from Illusion, perhaps most famously explicated by A.J. Ayer, comes in 
two stages. First, the argument asks us to look at the bad case: a stick in water, an object at a 
distance, a mirage, the hallucination of pink elephants, etc. Since the objects cannot have the 
properties that are present in our immediate awareness of them, either because we know the 
external object does not have those properties or because there is no external object to begin 
with, there must be something else that has those properties of which we are aware.
15
 These 
objects of which we are aware are sense-data. 
 The second part of the Argument from Illusion states that what we are aware of in 
veridical perception are also sense-data, not the objects of perception themselves. Ayer gives 
                                                          
14
 Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 656. 
15
 A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1964), 4-5. 
 8 
 
three different arguments to justify this claim. First, the experience of veridical perception and 
the experience of illusion/hallucination are qualitatively indistinguishable for the subject 
undergoing them. If they are indistinguishable for the subject, then it stands to reason that they 
are the same type of experience. We often times mistakenly claim that illusions or hallucinations 
are the genuine article, and this is a possibility because of this indistinguishability. Second, when 
an object of perception transitions from possessing illusory qualities into a veridical perception, 
no major change seems to take place. Although an object at a great distance may seem small, 
nothing with respect to the experience changes in quality as I slowly begin to approach the object 
and appreciate its true magnitude. But if there is no difference between the two types of 
experience as they “shade into one another”,16 then how could the two types of events be 
drastically different? The last argument begins by pointing out that altering the conditions under 
which a certain object is observed affects the properties the object of perception possesses. 
However, since external-objects have fixed properties, altering the conditions under which they 
are viewed should not alter their properties. And since these properties do change, then the 
objects of perception cannot be the material objects themselves; they must be sense-data.
17
 
 Putting aside the third argument,
18
 the other arguments share a common theme. The idea 
that sense-data are the objects of awareness in both the good and bad cases is based on two 
significant claims. First, that we are aware of sense-data in the delusory case and, second, the 
fact that the good and bad cases are indistinguishable. Due to a subject’s inability to distinguish 
between veridical perception and the perfect hallucination, this suggests that the two types of 
                                                          
16
 Ibid. 9 
17
 Ibid. 10-11 
18
 I do not find this argument very persuasive, as it relies on a gratuitous assumption that takes it that objects 
cannot look certain ways under different conditions if we are directly aware of those objects. What would ever 
lead us to consider this to be true? Why can’t a penny, which is round, look elliptical when viewed from a specific 
angle? To insist that perception must be subjective on these grounds is rather puzzling, as Austin notes when 
discussing the use of the word ‘real’, 82. 
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experience are the same type of experience. Both the good case and the bad case have a 
common-element that is present in both. In the context of Ayer, this common-element is a sense-
datum. 
 Sense-data are no longer in vogue, but the Argument from Illusion still plays a substantial 
role in the philosophy of perception, specifically the argument of indistinguishability. If 
indistinguishability shows us anything, so the argument continues, it is that there is a common-
kind that occurs in both the good case and the bad case. Furthermore, this common-kind must be 
a private, intramental object that explains the compatibility between being certain that you are 
having an experience of a certain type, while being ignorant as to whether or not anything 
corresponds to that experience. Whatever the status of sense-data, it seems the idea of an 
‘experience’ as the common-element in both cases is here to stay. 
Hinton claims that if there are such things as ‘experiences’, then one ought to give reports 
that seemingly refer to a common-kind; an E-report (an ‘experience’-report).19  
E-report: a report on a common-kind, a report made by a subject on an ‘experience’ in the 
most minimal sense. 
In offering an E-report, the subject limits their ontological commitments solely to a common-
kind: “I am having the ‘experience’ of seeing bright-lights, an ‘experience’ which is present in 
both veridical perception and hallucination.” That is, in making an E-report, one only commits 
oneself to a common-kind of which they are aware, leaving the question open as to what an E-
report is, in a more substantive sense, a report on. In contrast, to fulfill this role, we could offer 
R-statements (a representation-statement). 
R-statement: a statement or proposition which identifies the common-kind and in doing 
so clarifies the notion of the ‘common-kind’. 
                                                          
19
 J. M. Hinton, Experiences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 60. 
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 An R-statement would then make a claim about the intramental object of which the subject is 
aware, “The sense-datum has the characteristic of being bright and circular.”20 What 
characterizes an E-report is that it is a report of the ‘pure’ experience; a report that is indubitable 
and true irrespective of whether or not the experience in question is veridical or hallucinatory. 
This intuition is one of many which influenced Descartes’ great works, an intuition that still 
speaks to us today. R-statements, in contrast to E-reports, require detailed analysis by the 
philosopher in order for us to say anything about them whatsoever. R-statements, which are 
fraught with theoretical difficulties, can refer to sense-data or representational objects, depending 
on the specific philosophical theory one endorses. Although philosophers have and do disagree 
on how to characterize R-statements, E-reports reach back to philosophy’s early conception.21  
 However, might we think that this conception of ‘experience’ is misguided? In one sense, 
this seems unlikely. E-reports, putting aside some problematic concerns, appear to be entirely 
uncontroversial. If something appears to us, and we are unsure if the object in question is real or 
not, as when Descartes countenances the idea of the evil-demon, then nevertheless E-reports are 
still entirely credible. If I am unsure of the veridicality of my experience, I am at least certain 
that I am having the ‘experience’ in question. But is this thought justifiable? 
1.2 Why Disjunctivism? 
 Imagine being the witness to a late-night mugging. After witnessing the perturbing event, 
the detective running the case asks you the following question, “How many muggers were 
there?” Now, due to this night being particularly foggy, you have difficulty in answering this 
question. At times there may have seemed to be only three figures: the two criminals and the 
                                                          
20
 Although I use the dated concept of a ‘sense-datum’ in this specific R-statement, R-statements can also refer to 
so-called intentional objects as well or any putative intramental object for that matter, including representational 
objects. 
21
 See Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1969), 124. 
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victim. But at other times it seemed that there may have been four figures: three criminals and 
the victim. How would you then, given this difficulty, respond to the question the detective 
posed? Possible answers would include, “Well, it was difficult to see, and at times it looked as if 
there were two muggers, but at other times it looked as if there were three,” or, “There were 
definitely at least two, but there was one shadowy figure that could have been another person.” 
In response, the detective might follow up by asking, “So there were either two or three 
muggers?” and you would respond with, “Yes.” You would most surely not respond with, “No, 
that I am not sure of. I am only sure of there being two muggers and one shadowy figure.” 
 So what is the point of all of this? The first point is that in our everyday, ordinary 
conversations, the use of E-reports seems rather absurd. Although we may speak of seeing a 
‘shadowy figure’, we are not referring to an object that is identified as a ‘shadowy figure’. 
Instead, either the ‘shadowy figure’ is a mugger cloaked amongst the mist, or the mysterious 
figure is the result of lights and shadows reflecting off clouds of vapor. It would seem strange to 
insist that one had actually seen a ‘shadowy figure’; ‘shadowy figures’ do not generally have a 
place in our ontology. But this is precisely what the sense-data theorist claims.
22
 One experiences 
a ‘shadowy figure’, and features of this specific type of sense-datum are present for either a fog-
drenched mugger, or a unique spectacle of cloud and light. One could remain completely 
ambivalent as to the nature of the object, yet still maintain that they saw something which is 
neither a mugger nor an illusion. The ‘shadowy figure’ would be a mental object, such as a sense 
datum, and that is what the subject experienced. But, to answer the question of what one has 
seen, as in the case of responding to the detective, by affirming that one has literally seen a 
                                                          
22
 Some might object to the claim that sense-data theorists actually maintain that their ontology allows for the 
existence of ‘shadowy figures’. But if the sense-datum one is experiencing is neither a mugger nor an illusion, then 
it is something else. This reported mental object would have the properties characteristic of what we would call a 
‘shadowy figure’. It would look different shades of grey, and have a figure resembling that of a human. What other 
characteristics might we attribute to the sense datum?  
 12 
 
‘shadowy figure’, while remaining completely aloof as to the nature of the ‘shadowy figure’, 
misses the intent of the question. In our everyday life, E-reports are not very useful. 
 The second, more important point is that the use of E-reports seems to be unnecessary. In 
answering the question posed by the detective, we are being asked what we saw at the scene of 
the crime. The answer to this question is simple: we are unsure. What we saw might have been a 
third person, or it might have been an illusion. I can go into further detail and describe what I 
saw, but at the same time I am unsure as to what it is that I saw. But to respond to this 
uncertainty (two or three muggers) with the claim that I am certain of one thing, specifically with 
what the experience was like, is rather unhelpful. True, I may be certain of the characteristics of 
that experience, but how does this give support to the idea of E-reports? 
 The most immediate response to this question would be that we are certain of the belief, 
“I saw a shadowy figure,” and this belief must be true in virtue of something. Since I do not 
know if what I saw was a mugger, but somehow managed to indubitably know how the scene 
'looked', then I am able to offer an E-report; a report of how the scene 'looked'. Since we are 
uncertain whether we truly saw a person, and it might very well be the case that we saw 
someone, our belief that we saw a shadowy figure must be true in virtue of some type of sense-
datum. Just as Descartes identified the ‘mental’ as that which we are certain of in our state of 
doubt, so does the witness point to this private, mental event as the source of their certainty.  
 Is this response satisfying? I strongly believe that it is not. As Hinton puts it, it confuses 
what makes a thing true with what makes a thing known.
23
 We can be certain of what the 
experience was like, yet remain completely ambivalent as to what type of event one has 
experienced. Just as we can be certain that what we saw looked like a ‘shadowy figure’, but 
remain undecided as to what it is that one saw. “But”, says the opponent, “What makes the claim 
                                                          
23
 Hinton, Experience, 95. 
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true are sense-data!” How they found themselves proposing such an answer is somewhat 
perplexing, as what makes the claim true is far simpler: we are observing either a mugger or 
something that seems to be a mugger. What makes the claim ‘I saw a shadowy figure” true is 
either the presence of a third mugger, or is made true by light reflecting off mist or a 
hallucination; we are simply unsure of which of the two disjuncts is true. One of the disjuncts 
will be true, and this is what makes claims about ‘shadowy figures’ to be true; not the experience 
of a sense-datum. Furthermore, claims about how a scene 'looks' need not provide evidence for 
E-reports either, as deceptive experiences necessarily 'look' identical to their veridical 
counterparts; otherwise they would not be deceptive. Whether or not what I saw was a mugger, it 
will 'look' as if there were one. So why think that 'look' claims provide evidence for E-reports, 
rather than thinking that muggers and mugger-illusions just simply 'look' the same? 
 This question is the starting point for disjunctivism. Rather than arguing that E-reports 
are types of reports that refer to a private type of experience, disjunctivism takes the position that 
E-reports really are, all things considered, disjunctive reports. Describing ‘one’s experience’ just 
consists of describing the world or describing what seems to be the world (hallucinations, 
illusions, etc.). When I say, “I am seeing a shadowy figure,” one is actually saying, “I am seeing 
a mugger or light is reflecting off the fog in a deceptive manner.” Although this equivalence may 
seem unlikely at first, the claim is rather benign. All the disjunctivist claims is that sentences of 
the type ‘I am experiencing X’ are indicators of uncertainty. The subject knows that they are 
aware of something, they are just unaware of what it is they are experiencing. When Descartes 
states that he is certain that his hand seems to be before him, he is correct. But this does not 
provide evidence for E-reports. Rather, this is evidence for limited, epistemic access; not a 
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unique, ontological category. What Descartes knows is that his experience is either veridical or 
hallucinatory. After all, what else could it be? 
 The idea of the common-kind is closely linked with Cartesian scepticism.
24
 If we doubt 
everything, including the existence of the external world, it is no surprise that we arrive at the 
idea of an ‘experience’. An ‘experience’ is what we are aware of when confronted with the 
Cartesian demon. Since, according to Descartes, my ‘experience’ is (at first) logically consistent 
with the existence of an evil demon, most of my current beliefs would be about the unknowable 
i.e. beliefs about supposedly unknowable external objects. However, I could not doubt that it 
seems that these are my hands, and so that which I am aware of cannot be the real world. For if I 
perceived the external world (my actual hands) then doubting my perception of the external 
world would be equally as absurd as doubting the existence of oneself or doubting that I am 
undergoing experiences of some type. What certainty Descartes is left with is a certainty that I 
am undergoing a certain type of ‘experience’. ‘Experience’ then takes on a foundational role, as 
one cannot distinguish between veridical perception and deceptions at all. One cannot rely on 
veridical perception itself to play any substantial, epistemological role because once in the 
sceptical dilemma we are unable to differentiate between veridical and non-veridical perception. 
Descartes’ replacement is ‘experience’, a basic, ontological category that is present in both 
veridical and non-veridical perception i.e. a common-kind.  
It is this thought, if any, which motivates the intuition that there must be a common-
kind.
25
 If I were ever a brain-in-a-vat, it seems that I should be able to give more than just 
disjunctive reports. The intuition is that I ought to be able to make true, non-disjunctive 
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statements about my experience as a brain-in-a-vat. If one, let us call him Dan, knew that he was 
a BIV, then he would be in a position to make 'look-statements' which are both true and justified: 
“It looks as if there are bright-lights above me.” Dan would be in a position to affirm that what 
he is experiencing is illusory; there are no bright-lights, it only looks or seems like there is. 
Contrast this with the person, say Smith, who does not know if he is a BIV or not, but whose 
experience is indistinguishable from Dan’s experience. Smith, who happens to be a philosopher, 
may begin to doubt that he perceives reality, instead of a mere facsimile. To affirm that his 
perception is veridical is to assume the point at issue, and so Smith may resort to the use of 
disjunctive reports: “I am seeing bright-lights or it seems like I am seeing bright lights”. For this 
person who is in the position of doubt, all they can give are disjunctive reports; otherwise they 
would not be in doubt. But many real-world philosophers find this troubling. Many insist that we 
possess at least some knowledge when faced with the sceptical challenge, but this knowledge 
must be non-disjunctive in nature. Why insist upon this? Just as Dan is able to make the non-
disjunctive claim with confidence, we are pushed to accept that Smith can make the non-
disjunctive claim as well, since their experiences are indistinguishable from one another. More 
importantly, if Dan is made unaware that he is a BIV, his experience will still remain 
indistinguishable from Smith’s experience. If the person who is a BIV, Dan, has the same 
evidence as he whose experience is veridical, Smith, then how do we arrive at a difference 
between veridical perception and hallucination?  
However, both the naive realist and the disjunctivist reject this type of reasoning. Both 
positions hold that the common-sense view of perception is the correct account. Perception gives 
us direct access to the world, and we have very little trouble actually discerning the good case 
from the bad case.  But the sceptic challenges us to defend this claim. If we abandon the idea that 
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perception gives us direct access to the world, which is a step towards the sceptical argument, 
then we will be lead to accept a common-kind for experience, whether it is veridical or not. The 
non-disjunctivist states that this conclusion is justified because, regardless of whether or not one 
is a BIV, it is logically possible that the experience will be the same. The good case and the bad 
case are indistinguishable. But if they are indistinguishable then perception cannot give evidence 
of our direct access to the world. This is the primary intuition against disjunctivism, the claim 
that we cannot truly know if our perceptions provide us with direct access to the world; all we 
are aware of (à la Hume) is an 'inner stage'. 
However, the sceptic assumes that the epistemological similarity between the good case 
and the bad case reflects a metaphysical similarity. What reason do we have to accept this 
assumption? I might not be able to distinguish a painting and an exceptional forgery, but this 
does not entail that the two paintings share a special metaphysical status, let alone the status of 
being the same work of art. Furthermore, why play the sceptics’s game in this instance? If we do, 
why concede the valuable distinction between veridical perception and hallucinations? Why even 
take the sceptic’s recommendations seriously? Why not say there is only an epistemological 
difference between the good case and the bad case? If scepticism is strong-arming us into 
discarding naive realism, perhaps we need to reconsider the value of methodological 
scepticism.
26
 I do not expect this account to convince the opponent; rather in identifying our 
intuitions we are in a better position to evaluate them.  
1.3 Hinton and the Disjunctive Position 
 Explicitly stated, disjunctivism, as a philosophical position, states that there is no 
common-kind between veridical perception and hallucinations. What is the ‘common-kind’ that 
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 Although I acknowledge that this reply to the sceptic is unsatisfying, the intuition put forward by the sceptic is 
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the disjunctivist denies? John McDowell’s expression is more apt in referring to the common-
kind as the “highest common factor [italics added]”27. This expresses the true position of the 
disjunctivist, which denies that veridical perception and hallucinations are instantiations of the 
same type of event; the notion that the common factor must be the essential feature of the good 
case and the bad case. Hinton identifies this common-kind as an “experience”. An ‘experience’ is 
that which occurs in both veridical perception and hallucination, an event we can report on in 
both the good and bad case (an E-report). The common-kind is not simply a shared characteristic 
between the good and bad case but a fundamental essence that constitutes the two events.
28
  
The very notion of an E-report, says the disjunctivist, is mistaken, as it assumes that what 
one is ‘neutrally’ describing could be either veridical or hallucinatory. The traditional argument 
from illusion, which relies on indistinguishability, is explicitly denied; one type of experience 
simply seems to be like another. One is describing the world or what seems to be the world; not 
some other object which can be either a veridical experience or a hallucination. Since the two 
types of experience are different, there is no need to introduce the common-element. This 
disjunctive account of experience is recent to the philosophical scene, but are there good 
arguments for the position? 
 As has already been noted, disjunctivism is rooted in how human beings typically live 
their lives. We note the similarities between hallucinations and real-objects, but we do not treat 
the two vastly different experiences the same; unsurprisingly, one is of objective reality and the 
other is not. We have relatively little difficulty discerning between hallucinations and veridical 
perception. In our experiences, we do not encounter anything which partially resembles sense-
data; sense-data are the result of philosophical theorizing. 
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 McDowell, 81. 
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 The sense-data theorist thinks that this fundamental object is a sense-datum, while the intentional theorist holds 
that the fundamental item is an intentional representation. 
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If disjunctivism is an accurate account of how we ordinarily talk about our experiences, 
this adds to its claim of being the default position. But before we can endorse such a position, 
there are two obvious questions which we must ask: 1) On what grounds can we claim 
disjunctivism to be the default position and 2) Are there convincing reasons to discard the default 
position? 
 There have been two traditional arguments that have been issued in favor of discarding 
the disjunctivist position, the argument from indistinguishability and the causal argument, and 
the purpose of this thesis is first, to assess the strength of one of these arguments, and, as I 
previously stated, I take it that the causal argument is the truly serious objection to the 
disjunctivist. Second, in answering the causal argument, we will find that indistinguishability 
does not give evidence for the common-kind. Given that we have the ability to address this 
argument (2), the strength then of the disjunctivist position lies with its ability to claim to be the 
default position (1). And as I hope to show, the disjunctivist eventually addresses (1) and (2) in 
quite similar ways. 
 To begin establishing this default position, Hinton asks us to answer the question, “What 
is happening?” when we consult our experience.29 We could claim that there was a mugger, or, if 
we are uncertain, we could say that we are inclined to believe that there was a mugger. Likewise, 
we could do the same in claiming that what one saw was an illusion. Note that it is highly 
implausible that I doubt the claim, "I saw a shadowy figure." How could a subject, who is 
attentive to their experience, be uncertain in making this basic claim? Although I could doubt 
that I saw a mugger, I am at least certain that it 'looked' a certain way.  However, if we are 
unsure of what is happening, another sure fire way of being correct is by giving a disjunctive 
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 J.M. Hinton, “Visual Experiences” in Disjunctivism, ed. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue, (London, The MIT Press, 
2009), 2. 
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answer: (AvB). Offering a disjunctive report exhausts the possible options; there were three 
muggers or there only seemed to be three muggers. To say that one was only inclined to believe, 
rather than certain, that 'there was a mugger or that there only seemed to be a mugger', would 
come off as disingenuous. It is either one or the other. 
 If this is the case, what then of E-reports? Can disjunctive reports serve the same function 
of providing certainty? One of the arguments for the case of E-reports lies in their special 
epistemic status; we are nearly certain when giving them. But disjunctive reports also have the 
characteristic of being certain; doubting them is especially suspect. If this is the case, being 
certain of your experience is not to be certain that you had this unique type of ‘experience’ that 
can be either a veridical perception or a hallucination, rather you are certain the experience you 
had was either veridical or hallucinatory. And this is the way that we generally treat our 
experiences.  
One might object that one cannot simply replace E-reports with disjunctive reports, as E-
reports capture a non-disjunctive aspect of experience. Furthermore, when one uses E-reports, its 
meaning varies drastically from the meaning of a disjunctive report, and hence disjunctive 
reports cannot serve the same function as an E-report. However, both of these objections beg the 
question. In response to the first objection, it is unknown as to what this special, non-disjunctive 
feature of our experience is supposed to be. The response to my question, historically, has been 
offered by claiming that some feature of our experience is incompatible with certain 
metaphysical theses, as our experience is found to conflict with certain features of an 'objective 
world'. But these arguments lose their force when applied to the disjunctivist, as the disjunctivist 
specifically denies the common-kind thesis. For the Argument from Illusion, and the Argument 
from Hallucination, try to convince us that a common-kind is necessary to explain illusions and 
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hallucinations. Disjunctivism, however, undermines these arguments by pointing out that 'the 
possibility of deception' shows very little. If the disjunctive position is incorrect, then perhaps 
the argument from illusion works. But this assumes what is at point. Even if the meaning of E-
reports is different from disjunctive reports, whether or not one is justified in using E-reports 
needs to be shown. The most obvious way to justify the use of E-reports would be to appeal to 
the special features of experience which E-reports seek to express. But, as was just stated, this 
assumes a special feature of our experience which disjunctivism explicitly denies. 
Lastly, another way to prove that there are E-reports is by appealing to the existence of R-
statements, statements about sense-data or representational objects.
30
 Hinton argues for at least 
ten requirements one must meet in order to justify using R-statements, including the ability to 
clearly answer the question of what is happening when we have experiences.
31
 But since these 
requirements are not met, specifically the requirement of clarity,
32
 we cannot justify the use of R-
statements, let alone the use of E-reports. Furthermore, if such things as E-reports are justified, it 
follows that we should be able to make R-statements. If I can report on an ‘experience’, I should 
be able to make statements regarding the ontology of that experience. Since an R-statement 
cannot meet the demands of the requirement of clarity, ‘experiences’ must remain ontologically 
mysterious.
33
  
This is the general strategy that disjunctivism utilizes. They first ask us as to how we tend 
to describe our experiences, and point out that a disjunctive account largely conforms to both our 
experiences and our ordinary ways of talking. If we then try to describe an experience using an 
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 We might be utterly convinced of the existence of E-reports, and so may be comfortable with R-statements 
remaining mysterious. Whether or not there we require a minimal conception of a common-kind then becomes 
the main issue. 
 21 
 
E-report, the disjunctivist responds by asking us to justify the introduction of a type of report 
which introduces new, metaphysical baggage. This then leads to a dilemma: either disjunctive 
reports, upon closer examination, turn out to perform the same work E-reports do (in the relevant 
sense), or E-reports assume the existence of the very event they are intended to be reporting on.
34
 
If E-reports cannot be justified on different grounds, then how could we further justify that there 
is a common-kind, which we just so happen cannot speak of? For Hinton, the common-kind 
thesis was one of the final remnants of sense-data, waiting to be discarded.
35
 
1.4 Snowden’s Translucence and Martin’s Naive Realism 
Are there any arguments against the notion of E-reports? At least two arguments can be 
given which attempt to do so. The first argument is laid out by Paul Snowden in the context of 
the causal theory of perception. In his seminal article “The Causal Theory of Perception”, H. P. 
Grice argues that the concept of ‘perception’ entails that the subject is causally connected to the 
object of perception;
36
 if P sees O, then O causes an experience undergone by P.
37
 Although we 
know this claim is true as a matter of fact, Grice states that this is a conceptual truth, such that 
any person who can successfully use the particular concept (in this case, ‘perception’) will agree 
to a specific claim about the concept in question.
 38
 Grice legitimates this conceptual truth on the 
grounds that introducing ‘causality’ is the only way to differentiate between veridical perception 
and hallucinations; the good case is causally connected to the object of perception and the bad 
case is not.
 
Since veridical perception and hallucinations can be indistinguishable from one 
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another, we differentiate the good from the bad case by stating that it is a conceptual truth that if 
P sees O, then O causes an experience undergone by P.
 39
 
Snowden’s objection to the causal theory does not deny that causality is necessary for 
perception as a matter of fact, but rather Snowden argues that the causal theory of perception is 
not a conceptual truth.  Snowden defends this by claiming that the causal theory of perception 
relies on a non-disjunctive conception of experience, and Grice exploits this to provide a simple 
argument in favor of the causal theory. Grice, Snowden claims, employs the notion of ‘an 
experience’ within the conceptual analysis, where ‘an experience’ is a type of common-kind. 
Since the subject is aware of ‘an experience’ in both the good and bad case, ‘experience’ is not 
sufficient for ‘an experience’ to be veridical. Hence, Grice introduces causality as a necessary 
condition for veridical perception to occur. Snowden agrees with Grice that the causal theory of 
perception would be a conceptual truth, but only if disjunctivism was not a live-option. Since 
disjunctivism denies that there is a common-kind (an ‘experience’) in the good and bad case, the 
motivation to introduce causality as a necessary condition to differentiate between veridical 
perception and hallucination vanishes. Since disjunctivism is a competing account of perception, 
Snowden can argue that the conception of ‘experience’ utilized by the causal theory is unfairly 
assumed, as this conception of ‘experience’ assumes the common-kind thesis. But, says 
Snowden, this assumption undermines the status of the causal theory of perception as a 
conceptual truth, as it is conceptually possible that we offer a disjunctive account of perception 
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that need not rely on giving a causal story to distinguish between veridical perception and 
hallucination.
40
 
Although we may not necessarily agree with Snowden’s approach to the causal theory of 
vision, we might agree with Grice that perception by definition requires that we are causally 
related to the objects of perception. But this is to miss the point. Snowden is identifying a 
problematic conception of Grice’s argument, where to differentiate between the good case and 
the bad case requires that we have knowledge of the object of perception’s causal antecedents. 
But if we are able to distinguish between the good case and the bad case by utilizing the 
disjunctivist denial of the common-kind, other avenues open up as to how we are able to 
demonstrate that a certain experience is veridical.
41
 In his discussion Snowden rightfully points 
out that experience is translucent and considers this to count against the causal theory.
42
 
Experience is characterized as ‘translucent’43 due to the fact that when we look to our 
experience, it is as if we were directly aware of the objects themselves, or, as Snowden puts it, 
“there is nothing to the experience from our point of view, other than the aspects of the object it 
acquaints us with.”44 If experience is translucent, then this provides evidence for the idea that in 
veridical perception we directly perceive the objects of perception. But this counts against an 
‘inner’ conception of experience, which the common-kind conception of experience endorses.45  
Is this an argument for disjunctivism? Yes, specifically because our pretheoretical 
conception of ‘experience’ consists of the experience being translucent for the subject. But if the 
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common-kind thesis is correct, then experience would only appear translucent, for we are not 
actually being presented with the external world, but a sense datum or representation. To 
distinguish between veridical perceptions and hallucinations, if translucence was itself an 
illusion, might require the causal theory of vision to make sense of how we differentiate between 
the good and bad case. So not only does the common-kind thesis run against our pretheoretical 
conceptions, but there is the added danger of running into ‘the veil of perception’, where we are 
never directly aware of the external world.
46
 
However, a possible objection to Snowden's translucence may claim that there is more to 
experience than just the objects of experience; there is also the phenomenology of the 
experience. One may be able to classify all the objects a bat may encounter in its environment, 
but any conception of the subjective experience of a bat—the ‘what it is like to be a bat’—will 
also include this phenomenological character.
47
 Since, states the objection, this phenomenal 
description is absent in the ‘translucent conception of experience’, experience is not, as Snowden 
states, translucent; we do not perceive these phenomenal qualities as objects. Therefore, the 
argument from the translucent nature of experience cannot provide evidence for the disjunctive 
thesis. In fact, the phenomenological qualities of experience may be used to reinforce the 
common-kind thesis, as these phenomenological qualities may be characterized as qualia: “the 
properties of mental states or events [...] which determine “what it is like” to have them.”48 If 
qualia are a type of intramental object, then experience is ‘inner’ and naive realism is false. 
To properly address the problem introduced by the phenomenology of our experience is 
far beyond the scope of this paper. That being said, it is entirely within the means of the naive 
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realist to attempt to address these issues.
49
 Whether or not the opponent finds this response 
satisfactory, the non-disjunctivist must also accommodate the phenomenology of our experience 
as well. So, although Snowden’s characterization of ‘translucence’ may be inadequate, this does 
not undermine our pretheoretical conception of experience as translucent, nor threaten our direct 
consciousness of external objects, nor does the phenomenology of our experience necessarily 
serve as evidence for the common-kind thesis. 
Continuing along, we might be suspicious of Snowden’s claim that our pretheoretical 
conception of ‘experience’ is not compatible with the common-kind thesis, but M.G.F. Martin 
offers an argument in support of Snowden’s claim. This rather indirect argument holds that the 
common-kind thesis is incompatible with naive realism.
50
 Martin asks us to accept a triad of 
positions. The first is naive realism, the view that in veridical perception, the properties that 
objects have to someone who perceives the objects are actual properties of the objects i.e. one 
could not have the experience they are having unless the object did not have the property they 
are perceived to have.
51
 The second position is experiential naturalism, the view that our 
experiences are the result of natural, causal processes that may be either purely physiological or 
partly psychological in nature.
52
 The last position is the common-kind thesis. The problem then 
is if we attempt to adopt all three positions, this will result in incoherence. If we acknowledge (as 
we obviously should) that the causal process of perception can be manipulated (as with 
hallucinatory drugs), and if we accept that hallucinations share a common mental feature with 
veridical perception, then that same mental event can occur regardless of whether or not the 
object being perceived is present. But if this is the case, naive realism could not possibly be true, 
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as there is no external object which has the properties of the hallucinated object. Instead, the 
common-kind explains how the object is presented. It is not because we are directly aware of the 
properties of an object that they appear the way they do, but because the common-kind possesses 
those properties which the object appears to have.
53
 Since these three views are incompatible, the 
least plausible thesis should be abandoned. Martin nominates the common-element thesis to take 
this role. It is unlikely that Martin’s argument would be convincing for his opponents, and the 
argument ultimately hinges on Martin’s case for naive realism.54 Nonetheless, for those who are 
sympathetic to naive realism, Martin’s argument for disjunctivism has force. 
It might still be said that naive realism cannot account for hallucinations simpliciter, but 
this misses the point of Martin’s argument. Naive realism is a view about veridical perception, 
and says little about hallucinations (at least initially). The problem generated with introducing 
the common-kind thesis is that it brings hallucinations under the umbrella of naive realism, as 
what then constitutes veridical perception also constitutes hallucinations, and vice-versa. The 
naive realist would be forced to give a single story that includes both veridical perception and 
hallucination, rather than two separate explanations for each phenomenon, resulting in the 
absurdity just noted. 
Connecting this back to Snowden, note that Martin’s argument is further supported by 
experience. First, naive realism is supported due to experience being translucent, as naive realism 
states that objects have the properties which the subject perceives them to have.  Since 
experience is translucent, properties latch onto the object themselves; a position the naive realist 
endorses. Second, the fact that experience is translucent is troubling for he who posits that 
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experience is an intermediary between the subject and the external world; there is nothing ‘in 
experience’ which suggests that what we are aware of is anything other than the objects of 
perception themselves. One cannot locate a ‘sense-datum’ or a ‘representation’ in one’s 
experience in the same way one is aware of an object. If we are to endorse ‘inner’ objects, we 
must be adequately convinced that such things exist, and the arguments for ‘inner’ objects, such 
as the argument from illusion, rely on the common-kind thesis. 
55
 
In conclusion, if we are to ask how disjunctivism is to convince us, we get a seemingly 
unconvincing answer, as there is little argument offered to convince an opponent.
56
 The 
exception to this is the arguments from Snowden and Martin, which admittedly will not sway 
many opinions. But the aim of the disjunctivist is not to demolish long-held positions, but rather 
to challenge the opponent to justify her beliefs in light of the remarks made by the likes of 
Hinton, Snowden, and Martin.  
 Our ordinary discourse and experience do not seem to indicate that E-reports are justified, 
and we do not need grand systems to arrive at the disjunctive position. Having arrived at this 
position, the disjunctivist offers a challenge: What reason do we have to believe in the common-
kind? What is needed is to see if there are any effective arguments against the disjunctivist 
position, focusing on arguments for the common-kind. The goal of this thesis is to evaluate one 
of these arguments, the causal argument, and in discussing the answer to this question the 
disjunctivist’ challenge to their opponent will become more apparent. 
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1.5 Disagreements in Disjunctivism 
 Before introducing the causal argument, it is both important and worthwhile to briefly 
discuss the two main differences amongst disjunctivists. This is not merely just lip-service, but 
important when responding to the causal argument. 
 The first difference is how to categorize illusions. Up to this point in the paper I have 
been discussing both hallucinations (e.g. bright-lights) and illusions (e.g. a shadowy-figure) as 
experiences that only appear to be like veridical perception. However, it is unclear as to whether 
illusions should be grouped with veridical perceptions. With illusions there is still an object of 
perception in the world, while the objects we hallucinate are not 'in the world'. What determines 
if illusion is put on the right-side (VvI/H) or the left-side (V/IvH) depends on how the right-side 
of the disjunct is characterized.
57
 
 This is the second difference amongst disjunctivists. When formulating the disjunctivist 
account, we characterize the right disjunct by describing it as indistinguishable from veridical 
perception, and continue by claiming that the right disjunct only seems to be like the left 
disjunct.
58
 Some philosophers think that this way of negatively describing the right-disjunct, 
describing it as ‘what-it-is-not’, is just the first-step in constructing the theory and that “there 
may be available a more direct characterization of the second disjunct, [...] [t]he current 
characterization is just a sort of place-holder”59. In a complete version of the theory, there should 
be a comprehensive account of the right-disjunct. This position is known as positive 
disjunctivism. In contrast, some disjunctivists claim that only a negative description of the right-
disjunct is possible; we cannot give a positive description of the hallucination. Since the positive 
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disjunctivist gives a positive account of hallucinations, illusions are grouped with veridical 
perception. Hence, positive disjunctivists tend to group together illusions and veridical 
perception (V/IvH). Negative disjunctivists, on the other hand, only characterize hallucinations 
as what they are not. Since illusions also share this quality of appearing as something they are 
not, they are grouped together with hallucinations (VvI/H). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
My goal for the following chapter is to outline the principle strategies contained in the 
causal argument for the common-kind, and to dismiss one of these strategies. The causal 
argument takes two forms. The first is the strong argument, which intends to establish that what 
we are aware of in veridical perception is ontologically identical to what we are aware of in 
hallucination. The weak argument makes the lesser claim that what we are aware of in veridical 
perception, although different in important respects, still shares a common element with 
hallucinations. After finding that the strong causal argument requires that we make questionable 
assumptions regarding the nature of our experiences, I will set the stage for the next chapter, 
which will consist of the different disjunctive responses to the weak causal argument. 
2.1 The Cartesian Position, the Moderate, and the Disjunctivist 
 The players in this philosophical field, of which there are three, are divided in virtue of 
their commitment to the common-kind. The Cartesian position states that experience is logically 
private, and is often associated with the concept of a sense-datum.
60
 The common-kind, which 
disjunctivism vehemently denies, is not just common between the good and bad case for the 
Cartesian. Instead, he abolishes the distinction between the good and the bad case; both are the 
experience of the same sense-datum. Veridical perception and hallucinations may be different in 
virtue of how they correspond with the world, but they possess the same intrinsic characteristics.  
The moderate view is best conceived as a middle-ground between the Cartesian position 
and the disjunctivist position. The Cartesian position and the moderate position both agree that 
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there is a common-kind, but the Cartesian believes that the common-kind is sufficient for both 
veridical perception and hallucination; veridical perception has no intrinsic difference from 
hallucination. The same sense-datum is being observed. The moderate view and the disjunctivist 
both disagree with this claim, as both have discarded the idea of sense-data and agree that there 
is a significant difference between veridical perception and hallucination. However, the moderate 
position endorses the common-kind.
61
 Although, states the moderate, we can differentiate 
between veridical perception and hallucination, perhaps by invoking the notion of 
intentionality,
62
 we must retain the concept of the ‘common-kind’ and ‘an experience’ either for 
reasons to do with indistinguishability or because our understanding of causality demands it. 
The third position is disjunctivism, which eliminates the common-kind altogether. 
Although the moderate and the disjunctivist find common ground in claiming that veridical 
perception differs from hallucination, the disjunctivist also overlaps with the Cartesian position 
in positing that at least some of our experience is non-representational.
63
 This is evident in the 
disjunctivist’ commitment to naive realism, for the naive realist states that the objects of 
perception are “constituents of the experience.”64 For our present purposes, we can think of these 
three positions as part of a spectrum that starts with the Cartesian position, finds a median with 
the moderate, and ends in the denial of the common-kind with disjunctivism. 
With these distinctions in mind we can evaluate the strong-causal argument, which seeks 
to establish the Cartesian position. 
2.2 The Strong Causal Argument 
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 Howard Robinson, a prominent advocate of sense-data, offers these two statements as 
sufficient for establishing the strong causal argument: 
1. It is theoretically possible by activating some brain process which is involved in a 
particular type of perception to cause an hallucination which exactly resembles that 
perception in its subjective character. 
2. It is necessary to give the same account of both hallucinating and perceptual 
experience when they have the same neural cause. Thus, it is not, for example, plausible 
to say that the hallucinatory experience involves a mental image or sense-datum, but 
that the perception does not, if the two have the same proximate—that is, neural—
cause.
65
 
 
It is not difficult to arrive at support for the first statement. The fact that hallucinations are 
indistinguishable from veridical perception is offered as evidence. But, more importantly, one 
can easily see how the use of hallucinatory drugs results in the subject undergoing hallucinations; 
the chemicals that compose the drug alter the states of my brain, producing an experience that is 
not causally connected to the objects that I am perceiving. The hallucination is not preceded by a 
brain state that is any different from veridical perception; the same nerve-fibres fire in both 
cases. Even if we are to deny that it is presently practical to empirically confirm that veridical 
perception and hallucination share the same proximate cause, Robinson claims that it is 
theoretically possible. Not only is it logically possible, but it is empirically possible as well.
66
 
One can easily imagine, as Hinton does, a neurosurgeon activating or stabilizing a brain-state 
that is the proximate cause in a specific case of veridical perception, such as seeing a lemon. 
Since there is good empirical evidence that we can bring about the perfect hallucination by 
activating a specific brain state, we can confidently claim that the first statement is true. Since it 
is necessary to give the same account of veridical perception and hallucination, then we are 
forced to accept that veridical perceptions and hallucinations do not only possess a common-
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kind, but they are in fact the same type of thing.
67
 But why does Robinson expect us to accept 
(2)? The premise, that we necessarily treat the good case and the bad case the same, is the result 
of the metaphysical principle that the same causes have the same effects, henceforth known as 
SCP—the same cause, same effect principle.68 Since veridical perceptions and hallucinations 
share the same neural cause, the effect—the indistinguishable experience—is also the same. 
 This is known as the strong version of the causal argument, and Robinson uses it to 
establish the Cartesian position. An oft-quoted example is that of a counterfeit coin being used in 
a vending machine. Despite the fact that the counterfeit may lack some feature the genuine coin 
possesses, both coins will produce the same effect; the ejection of an item from the vending 
machine. Likewise, it does not matter if my experience is the result of light hitting my retina, 
activating my optic nerve, resulting in a synapse, or if a neuroscientist is able to bypass the 
tedious causal pathway by directly causing the synapse to fire, the firing of the synapse will 
produce the same causal upshot; the same experience. 
 The disjunctivist, who claimed that there is no reason to believe in the common-kind or 
the concept of an ‘experience’, according to the Cartesian, simply fails to acknowledge some 
basic scientific truths, specifically those surrounding the correlations between brain states and 
mental states. Having arrived at this empirical conclusion, we would be forced to claim that 
veridical perception and hallucinations are intrinsically the same thing. The only difference 
between the two is that veridical perception corresponds to an object in the world, but this 
difference is relational, and not intrinsic to the mental objects themselves. So not only do 
veridical perception and hallucinations possess the same intrinsic characteristics, but this also 
provides grounds for referring to an ‘experience’. In the strong case, an ‘experience’ is that of 
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which we are aware in perception, and we are only aware of the intrinsic characteristics of that 
experience.
69
 What one is aware of in perception is not the objects of perception themselves, but 
an ‘experience’ that can be either veridical or illusory depending on whether it corresponds or is 
causally-related to the proper object in the external world. 
 It can then be demonstrated then that the strong causal argument also applies to the 
moderate position. The strong argument establishes that a visual ‘experience’ of an object, 
whether it is veridical or hallucinatory, is one type of experience; the good case and the bad case 
are intrinsically identical. The moderate view denies this claim, as the good and the bad case will 
be different, in so far as the one is of an object and the other’s object is non-existent.70 But the 
strong argument strictly prevents the two cases from being different, despite the fact that the 
good case may be causally related or correspond correctly to the object of perception. However, 
to claim, says the Cartesian, that there is an intrinsic difference between the good and bad case is 
then an exercise in bad-faith; there simply can be no such difference. The moderate view, as well 
as the disjunctivist, falls under attack from the strong argument. 
 To recount the argument, Robinson argues that if we accept that a given hallucination has 
the same neural cause as its corresponding veridical perception (1) and if we have to give the 
same account of two experiences when they have the same neural cause (2), then there is a 
common-kind. Since the argument appears to be perfectly valid and a denial of (1), states 
Robinson, is likely impossible, it is not terribly surprising that all disjunctivists, as well as all 
moderates, ultimately reject (2). The disjunctivist can embrace (1), which has strong empirical 
support of a certain type, but deny SCP (2), maintaining that two drastically different types of 
experience can have the same proximate cause. But is such a denial plausible? 
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 Robinson claims that this is not possible, as to deny SCP is to embrace two radical 
positions.
71
 Although, concedes the Cartesian, SCP is firmly established as a principle in the 
physical sciences, perhaps it is incorrect to use in certain psycho-physical processes.
72
 However, 
since the good case and the bad case share the same proximate cause (1), the disjunctivist and the 
moderate take on the burden of giving an account of causality that allows for the same psycho-
physical process to cause the veridical perception in one case and hallucination in the other. It 
seems, as Robinson points out, that such an account would require the brain to be aware of its 
own causal antecedents and produce the correct type of experience; either the good case or the 
bad case, not a common-kind.
73
  
Compare veridically perceiving a bright-light to hallucinating an indistinguishable bright-
light that is caused by a neuroscientist. In the former case, what causes the ‘sighting’ is a long 
causal chain leading from the object of perception to the activation of a specific brain-state. In 
the latter case, the total brain state is identical to the brain state in the former, but without any 
causal connection to the object of perception. But if the brain-states of the two individuals are 
identical, how could they be aware of different objects (a bright light and a hallucination of a 
bright light)? It seems that the brain would have to be in a position to ‘know’ what the causal 
antecedent was before the conscious subject is aware of the object of perception; the brain, 
depending on the causal antecedent, chooses to produce the effect appropriate for the good case 
or the bad case. But since the brain is a 'classical' mechanistic organ, we cannot understand how 
this can be true. This is the first radical position, according to Robinson, that the disjunctivist and 
the moderate must take.  
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Second, one of the reasons for accepting (1) is to provide an explanation for why the 
good case and the bad case are indistinguishable from one another; they share the same 
proximate cause. But the reasons for endorsing (1) are supposedly lost if we abandon SCP. For 
how could the fact that they share a proximate cause, if the good case and bad case are 
intrinsically different, be relevant to two experiences being indistinguishable from one another if 
SCP is false?
74
 If SCP was true, then we could appeal to it as an explanatory principle to explain 
why a perfect hallucination is indistinguishable from veridical perception. But without that 
principle, why a perfect hallucination is indistinguishable from veridical perception remains a 
mystery. Hence, according to Robinson, the disjunctivist must construct an alternative account of 
causality that includes bizarre conditions, and indistinguishability between veridical perception 
and hallucinations simply remains mysterious. 
 Another intuitive way to understand Robinson’s complaint is to look at how events 
supervene on each other. Let us assume, against the Cartesian position, that neural event C 
causes perceptual event P only when the object of perception plays a causal role in the activation 
of C. Likewise, neural event C causes the hallucinatory event P* when the object of perception 
plays no causal role. Imagine then, that we have two doppelgangers that have identical total-
brain states; on a neurological level there is no difference in properties between our two persons. 
Dan, our first doppelganger, is experiencing veridical event P, while Smith, our second 
doppelganger, is experiencing hallucinatory event P*. Although they have identical brain states, 
states the disjunctivist along with the moderate, the experiences are different.  
 This claim, that Dan and Smith are experiencing different events while sharing identical 
brain states, is inconsistent with a specific intuition about mental events: mental events 
supervene on the total-brain state of an individual. That is, if and only if there is a difference 
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between the total-brain state of an individual will you find a difference in the mental events one 
experiences. If and only if there is a difference in the total brain states between Dan and Smith 
will there be a difference between the two mental events. However, (1) of the causal argument 
denies this biconditional; it is the same proximate cause in both cases. If mental events supervene 
on the total-brain state of an individual, then there can be no difference between Dan and Smith’s 
experience, as they share identical brain states. If C causes P* in the case of the hallucination—
in virtue of supervenience—C causes P* in the good case as well. 
 Notice that Robinson’s formulation of SCP entails that experience supervenes only on the 
total-brain state of an individual.
75
 It does not matter what causal antecedents are leading up to 
neural event C. Instead, neural event C will produce P* in virtue of SCP regardless of the 
environment where neural event C happens. In this way, the strong-causal argument is sufficient 
to establish the Cartesian position, which is equivalent to claiming that all mental events 
supervene only on the total brain state of an individual; regardless of whether the apple in front 
of me is truly there, I will have the same experience in both the good case and bad case.  
Hinton’s response to this, as Robinson points out, “does what is required and simply denies 
[SCP]”76 
2.3 Replies and Supervenience 
 Robinson is correct that the strong causal argument is convincing, but only in so far as we 
accept his narrow notion of the SCP, but, like Hinton, we have very good reason for rejecting 
this conception of SCP. Before offering the most convincing reasons, which consist of the denial 
                                                          
75
 Even though Robinson endorses sense-data, sense-data will then supervene on the total-brain state of an 
individual. It would be difficult, if not contradictory, for Robinson to hold that sense-data did not supervene while 
invoking SCP in the strong-causal argument. 
76
 Robinson, 156. 
 38 
 
of mental events supervening only on the total brain state of an individual, I wish to first discuss 
Robinson’s defense against George Pitcher. 
 Might there be a rebuttal to the SCP, in that the same cause can simply produce different 
effects? For instance, I can flip the light-switch and this generally results in improved luminosity. 
But this is not necessary; the light might burn-out. Although in each situation I am flipping a 
light-switch (the cause), different effects follow in each case. It is for these reasons that George 
Pitcher argues that although SCP may be true for every cause-and-effect pair, SCP is not true 
under every description.
77
 Pitcher, a moderate, wants to claim that a neural event causes K*, but 
we can describe K* as K (I see a bright light) or we can describe K* as K* (I am hallucinating a 
bright light). Although the same neural event causes K*, K* can be described as an instance of 
veridical perception or an instance of hallucination.
78
 It is in this way that Pitcher avoids the 
charge that the moderate violates SCP. Pitcher agrees that SCP is true, but not under every 
description. 
 This line of thought is not sufficient. Pitcher is in a dilemma, as Robinson notes, where 
SCP is vacuous or SCP must be characterized in the most specific, immediate context possible.
79
 
For instance, SCP could be fulfilled where the cause ‘seeing a bright light’ has the effect 
‘something happens to a person’.80 In the one case, seeing a bright light might cause the person 
to squint, while, in a different case, seeing a bright light might cause the person to dive out of the 
way of an oncoming train. Even though both people ‘see a bright light’ (the cause) and ‘do 
something’ (the effect), we are hesitant to classify this as an instance of SCP.  According to 
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Robinson, proper characterization of SCP needs to have the exactness of a natural law in order to 
avoid vacuity.
81
 Although Pitcher tries to maintain the moderate position and SCP, the proposal 
that SCP is only true under certain descriptions fails to capture the intuitive force of the principle 
Robinson has offered; with regard to neural events, SCP fully justifies premise (2). 
Note that there is a conceptual relationship between veridical perception and the object of 
perception, while with hallucination there is no such relationship. So if we find Robinson’s 
construal of SCP too narrow, then it is quite possible that the moderate and the disjunctivist meet 
the demands within the wider parameters of a revised SCP. For instance, veridical perception 
requires the object of perception to be causally related to the subject, and this is known a 
priori.
82
 This may be the grounds for a relation between objects of perception and veridical 
perception which can be formulated as a general law. Since perception is causally related to the 
object of perception, and if this relationship can be expressed as a general law, then stating that 
veridical perception is different from hallucination does not violate a narrow SCP, and would be 
a case of a wider notion of SCP. 
 As we will see, the argument against the strong-causal argument is quite simple: there are 
very good reasons to think that mental events do not supervene solely on the total brain state of 
an individual, and so Robinson’s conception of SCP is too narrow. Hinton’s rejection of this 
strong version of SCP is not a denial of SCP as a general principle, but is instead denying a 
problematic and highly controversial conception of causality and psycho-physical processes. 
 It is likely that the moderate will also accept a similar argument against Robinson’s 
conception of SCP; we have good reasons to think that mental events, such as beliefs and 
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perception, do not supervene solely on the total brain state of an individual. So the question is, 
“What are these reasons?” 
 Perhaps the most notable example in the philosophical literature is Hilary Putnam’s 
“Meaning and Reference” and the extended discussion in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. In these 
papers, Putnam argues that what determines the content of a belief partially involves the objects 
of one’s belief.83 In other words, a full account of belief will go beyond the psychological states 
of an individual; beliefs do not supervene solely on the total brain state of an individual.
84
 There 
is a relation between the individual and her environment which cannot be reduced to 
psychological states. Other examples include Wittgenstein’s private language argument85 and 
Timothy Williamson’s argument for non-reductive perceptual relations.86 All of these arguments 
are arguments against the thesis that mental events narrowly supervene on the 
neuropsychological states of an individual and, thus, arguments against Robinson’s narrow 
conception of SCP. 
 It is unlikely that this response will be satisfying for Robinson, for he explicitly states that 
he finds these arguments unconvincing and, ultimately, defective.
87
 Not only this, but my appeals 
to authority will most certainly lack any argumentative force for my opponent. Nonetheless, I 
take it that my comments are justified. First, and most importantly, to properly address 
Robinson’s concerns would require a significant critique of some of the most heavily debated 
topics of the past fifty years within Western Philosophy; an extension of topics beyond the scope 
of the present examination of disjunctive theories of perception. Second, this brief sketch of the 
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philosophical state of affairs demonstrates that Robinson’s strong causal argument is not 
dialectically robust enough to answer the objections (although, in the spirit of fairness, Robinson 
does attempt to address these issues). Since the strength of the strong causal argument relies on a 
narrow conception of SCP, the argument is convincing in-so-far that as can be convinced of the 
truth of SCP. 
 The moderate and the disjunctivist can offer a simple response to Robinson’s argument: 
we have good reasons to deny the narrow conception of SCP. We then do not have good reason 
to endorse (2), and possibly even (1), in rejecting SCP. Robinson’s criticisms that a rejection of 
his narrow conception of SCP gives us action-at-a-distance
88
 may be true. However, this will be 
determined by detailed, concise philosophical discussions about local causation, singular 
thought, internalism, externalism,
89
 and other fundamental philosophical discussions. 
Furthermore, by accepting a wider version of SCP we are still able to explain why the good case 
and the bad case are indistinguishable. In the meantime, the moderate and the disjunctivist can 
competently deny the narrow version of SCP, and provide a rebuttal to the strong-causal 
argument. 
2.4 The ‘Weak’-Argument and the Highest Common Factor 
 The much more difficult case for the disjunctivist can be called the weak argument. The 
weak argument acknowledges that there is a significant difference between the good case and the 
bad case, but, whatever their differences, they still have the same proximate cause and so must 
share a common-kind. This common-kind can then explain why the good case and the bad case 
are indistinguishable from one another, despite the differences between the two. This is the 
causal argument offered by the moderate. 
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 How is the weak argument different from the strong argument? The weak argument 
denies (2) in Robinson’s argument. Instead of claiming that veridical perception and 
hallucination must necessarily be treated the same, the moderate takes a type of middle ground. 
SCP still has force, as a firing neuron will produce a representational object, but this is not the 
complete story. A sufficient account will include the relationship between an intentional object 
and the object represented. Thus the moderate accepts a common-kind (a representation), but 
demands that perception goes over and beyond this description.
90
  
 It might be objected that the disjunctivist has no need to respond to the weak argument, 
as the disjunctivist position is completely compatible with the conclusion given. The disjunctivist 
can claim that although the good and bad cases share a common-kind, they do not share a highest 
common factor. So instead of thinking of veridical perception as hallucinations plus a relation, it 
is perhaps more helpful to think of hallucination as parasitic on veridical perception. Conceiving 
of the bad case this way conveys the sense that veridical perception is an established way of 
interacting with the world, and hallucinations, although indistinguishable from veridical 
perceptions, simply fall short of this standard. The disjunctivist concedes a type of common-
kind, but still finds essential differences between veridical perception and hallucination, and 
manages to claim coherency between disjunctivism and naive realism. The disjunctivist can 
agree with the premises of their opponent but deny that this offers any evidence against the 
disjunctivist; a common-kind is not necessarily a highest common factor, let alone grounds to 
claim that there is such thing as ‘an experience’ or E-reports.91  
Note how this addresses the initial worry of the weak-causal argument. Veridical 
perception and hallucination may share some properties, but this does not necessarily entail that 
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there is a ‘highest common factor’. For instance, if my dog and my bookcase are both brown 
then they share a common-property: the property of being brown. But this would not suggest that 
the two objects share a common-kind, where dogs and bookcases are instantiations of a more 
basic object of brownness. Likewise, the non-disjunctivist must establish that we are justified in 
positing a common-kind that is the ‘highest common factor”, where the ‘highest common factor’ 
provides grounds to talk of ‘an experience’. 
 However, as it stands, this is an untenable response to the weak-causal argument. Let us 
say K is the essential feature of veridical perception, and K* is the essential feature of 
hallucination. For the moderate, veridical perception then encapsulates both K and K*, while 
hallucination is simply mental kind K*. It is stated by the disjunctivist that the highest common 
factor between the two is K*, which, although seeming to be a concession of a common-kind, 
still preserves the intuition of naive realism. 
 Offering such an account is extremely difficult. First, this provides problems for Hinton’s 
arguments. Hinton thought we could not offer up E-reports, and suggested that we replace these 
with disjunctive reports. But any proposal of a common-kind, where K* is sufficient for the bad 
case, will provide grounds for E-reports. For when I am uncertain about whether or not what I 
see before my eyes is truly there, I can offer K*-reports. Since K* is sufficient for a type of 
experience (the experience of a hallucination), and because K* also is shared by the good case, 
one can offer K*-reports, as one knows that the experience either a) is partially constituted by K* 
or b) the experience is of the mental type K*. So although we may not think of K* as the highest 
common factor, since K* is sufficient for the bad case we can make non-disjunctive reports about 
K*. For example, suppose that through my deep, philosophical contemplations I begin to doubt 
that my cat is on the mat. While it is true that I could offer a disjunctive report on the matter, 
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“Either there is a cat on the mat or it seems there is a cat on the mat,” I could also offer a non-
disjunctive report, “I am K*-ing a cat on the mat.”92 This later report will be true, and 
appropriate, as K*-ing a cat on the mat is both sufficient and necessary for the bad case, and 
necessary for the good case. Regardless of whether my experience is veridical or hallucinatory, I 
will be justified in making reports on K*; disjunctive reports are no longer necessary. But if this 
is the case, what does disjunctivism amount to? 
 The second issue, perhaps more important than the first, is that if we concede that K* is 
sufficient for hallucination, then naive realism is sunk. If we return to the argument, if K* is 
sufficient for hallucinations, and because the good case and the bad case share the same 
proximate cause, K* will be present in the good case as well. Although it may seem that the 
naive realist could accept that K* is present in both the good case and bad case, while 
maintaining that K is only present in the good case, this does not go through. This is for two 
reasons. First, although we may claim that veridical perception is of K* and K, it is hard to see 
what role K has to play in the experience. If we admit that K* is sufficient for a type of 
experience, then why include K at all, especially considering that the difference between an 
experience of type K* is indistinguishable from an experience of type K? Perhaps we will still 
demand that K have some explanatory value that is absent in K*, but this position is then 
incompatible with naive realism.  
Recall that naive realism seeks to understand perception as somehow involving the 
objects of experience themselves, where my having the experience of a spherical ball is 
essentially tied to the ball being spherical. The problem for the naive realist is that in the bad 
case one can experience a spherical ball without there being a ball at all. The disjunctivist 
responds to this problem by claiming that there is no highest common factor, no ‘experience’, 
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which is present in instances of veridical perception and hallucination. But if K* is sufficient for 
a hallucination, then the motivation for naive realism is lost. Naive realism states that if 
something is perceived to be curved, it is perceived that way precisely because it is curved. But 
in instances of K*, something can appear to be curved, yet nothing is truly curved, or even 
existent! If we do veridically perceive an object to be curved, I will see it curved in virtue of K*, 
as K* is sufficient to allow an object to appear curved in the bad case. Surely K does not then add 
something to the mix which then allows one to perceive a truly curved object; the curve of the 
object is supplied through K*.  But this states exactly what the naive realist denies, specifically 
that if I perceive an object to have a certain characteristic, I perceive the object to possess that 
characteristic in virtue of the object possessing that characteristic. However, this is not true. You 
perceive many characteristics in virtue of K*, which does not need the proper object in order to 
be instantiated.  
 I hope it is clear then that the strategy of invoking the highest common factor, prima 
facie, does not solve the weak argument. Stated simply, the weak causal argument claims:  
 
1) If K* is sufficient for a hallucination, then K* is present in veridical perception because the 
good case and the bad case share the same proximate cause. Thus there is a common-kind and 
the disjunctivist is wrong. 
2) But, replies the disjunctivist, what is of concern is a highest common factor, not merely a 
common-kind. Disjunctivism is not necessarily demonstrated to be false by showing that there 
is a common-kind.  
3) However, by admitting that K* is sufficient for a specific hallucination, then there is such a 
thing as ‘an experience’ (K*), disjunctive reports are theoretically impotent, naive realism is 
incorrect, and the weak-causal argument demonstrates that disjunctivism is false. 
 
The driving force of this argument is that a certain neural state is sufficient for producing a 
hallucination (K*), and since K* is necessarily produced in veridical perception, the features of 
K* are also prevalent in veridical perception. If the disjunctivist is to provide an answer to the 
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weak argument, they must either assert that something other than K* is present in the good case 
(positive disjunctivism) or that hallucinations cannot be identified with K* (negative 
disjunctivism). Whether or not either of these responses is satisfying will be explored in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
CHAPTER III 
 It seems that both the moderate and the disjunctivist are able to respond to the strong 
causal argument; both deny that mental events supervene on the total brain state of an individual. 
However, the weak causal argument is put forward by the moderate to defeat the disjunctivist 
position. How have disjunctivists responded? Thirty years ago, when Snowden brought 
disjunctivism to the fore of philosophical discussion, the disjunctivist position was understood as 
what we now characterize as positive disjunctivism. However, at the turn of the millennium, 
disjunctivists returned to the original source material in Hinton, and a new generation of negative 
disjunctivists have followed in Hinton’s footsteps. Both positions provide different responses to 
the weak causal argument rooted in how they describe the bad case. 
 As I have suggested, I will argue that the negative disjunctivist takes the weak causal 
argument seriously, and seeks to establish the position without rejecting Experiential Naturalism, 
the view that our experiences are the results of natural, causal processes. After describing  
M. G. F. Martin’s account of negative disjunctivism, I will address some objections to his 
account. Before this, however, I will first look to, and ultimately dismiss, the positive 
disjunctivist. 
3.1 Snowden and the Positive Disjunctivist Response 
 In the first chapter, the reader may recall that Snowden presented two separate ideas. The 
first is the denial that ‘causality’, contra Grice, is part of our ordinary conception of vision. The 
second is the endorsement of positive disjunctivism: the thesis that one can give a thorough 
account of hallucination without positing a common-kind.
93
 After demonstrating how these ideas 
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jointly attempt a defense against the causal argument, I hope to demonstrate that this defense 
offered by the positive account is insufficient in answering the causal argument. 
 The main intent of Snowden’s two papers “Perception, Vision, and Causation” and “The 
Object of Perceptual Experience” is to undermine the causal theory of vision94 by attacking a 
standard Gricean argument, and Snowden argues that this standard argument requires that the 
disjunctive account of perception is a dead option. But since this is not the case, says Snowden, 
we lose our motivation to endorse the causal theory of vision. 
 To replace the causal theory of vision, Snowden offers a relational account of perception 
that is rooted in Hinton’s disposal of the common-kind. The difference between the good case 
and the bad case is not that the former has its causal antecedents generated by the object of 
perception, but that the subject is related in a special way to the object of perception. This 
perceptual relation requires that the experience is visual and that the object of perception can be 
“an object of demonstrative thought” for the subject in question, paradigmatically by referential 
use of the pronouns 'this' and 'that'.
95
 In order for an instance of seeing to be veridical, one must 
be able to say something demonstrative about the object in question. If, for example, a subject 
was veridically presented with a lemon, they ought to be able to entertain demonstrative thoughts 
about 'this' lemon. They can identify the lemon, imagine picking the lemon up, cutting it into 
quarters, or converting lemons into capital. However, the disjunctivist’ denial of the common-
kind prevents this type of relation from pertaining to hallucinations. One could mistakenly make 
demonstrative judgements about hallucinations, and so it might seem that hallucinations meet 
Snowden’s two requirements for veridical perception to occur. However, if one knew that they 
were being presented with a hallucination, one would have different thoughts: “If I take my 
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medication, then the bright lights will go away.” “As I walk towards the oasis, it will disappear.” 
“If I ask other people if they see the lemon, they will respond in the negative”. One would not be 
able to speak of 'this' lemon. In this way, hallucinations are like imaginings; although one can 
‘entertain’ the idea of having a refreshing beverage, one would not make the demonstrative 
thought that consuming an imaginary, refreshing beverage results in the real-satisfaction of my 
thirst. The ‘demonstrative’ thought appropriate for hallucinations is of a different kind than that 
which is appropriate for veridical perception. Since ‘perception’ requires no reference to the 
subject being causally related to the object of perception, Snowden is offering a non-causal 
account of ‘perception’.  
 Within this account, Snowden’s disjunctivism plays two roles, one metaphysical and the 
other epistemological. First, Snowden’s disjunctivism is used to dismiss the causal theory of 
vision; the causal theory of vision is true if and only if the common-kind assumption is true. 
Since there is no common-kind (the metaphysical claim), it is mistaken to think the causal theory 
of vision is correct. It is not in virtue of a special, strictly conceptual, causal relationship to the 
object of perception that allows for us to have demonstrative thoughts about lemons. Instead, 
veridical perception allows for this by definition without needing to incorporate the causal theory 
of vision to differentiate between the good case and the bad case. Second, his disjunctivism 
allows for veridical perception and hallucination to provide different evidence (the 
epistemological claim); there is no common-kind which provides evidence for either a veridical 
perception or a hallucination. Although it is true, in cases where we are agnostic about the nature 
of the situation before our eyes, that it seems like we have the same evidence (the experience of a 
common-kind), this is mistaken. If we are to entertain demonstrative thought about the situation 
before our eyes, this could be demonstrative thought about an external object or demonstrative 
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thought about a hallucination. If we were to mistakenly apply demonstrative thought about an 
external object to what is in fact a hallucination, this is not because we were presented with the 
same evidence in the good case and the bad case (the evidence of having an experience of a 
common-kind). Rather simply, we made a mistake; we took what was in fact a hallucination to 
be an external object. By making this epistemological claim, Snowden is able to defend the claim 
that veridical perception includes demonstrative thought about an external object, in contrast to 
hallucinations, because veridical perception provides a different type of evidence than 
hallucinations.
96
 
 Following this line of thought, we can see why Snowden is classified as a positive 
disjunctivist. Demonstrative thought about veridical perceptions is of another kind than 
demonstrative thought of hallucinations. How exactly we characterize the right-disjunct will be 
offered by the disjunctivist once the theory has been completed. Harold Langsam gives us a 
picture of what such an account might look like. Langsam argues: (i) for every phenomenal 
feature of an object, there exists an indistinguishable facsimile that takes place in hallucination, 
and (ii) hallucinations are relations between physical space and minds.
97
 To elucidate (i), 
Langsam states that in order for positive disjunctivism to be the correct account of perception, 
we must acknowledge that the phenomenal property of redness must have two instantiations; the 
phenomenal property of redness1, which occurs in the good case, is indistinguishable, but 
ontologically distinct, from the phenomenal property of redness2, which occurs in the bad case.
98
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We require pairs of phenomenal properties as it follows from the disjunctivist’ thesis: there is no 
common-kind, including any type of common-kind between phenomenal properties that is shared 
by the good case and the bad case. As for (ii), since Langsam, like Snowden, is offering a 
relational account of perception, hallucinations are to be understood as relations between a 
subject and physical space. Since the objects of hallucinations are not external objects, subjects 
must be related to something else in their environment. With this brief sketch of positive 
disjunctivism, we can now evaluate the resources with which it can respond to the causal 
argument. 
 The positive disjunctivist has an answer to the strong-causal argument: veridical 
perception essentially involves an object and hallucination does not. However, the weak causal 
argument issues a far more difficult challenge.  How could the same proximate cause, in the 
good case, result in the phenomenal property of redness1, while that same proximate cause, in the 
bad case, results in the phenomenal property of redness2? If there is a difference between the two 
phenomenal properties, then that might require that there exists such a thing as action at a 
distance, as neural event C causes the phenomenal property of redness1 in the good case and 
phenomenal property of redness2 in the bad case.
99
 
 Snowden gives a rather disappointing response. Despite being fully aware that the only 
arguments for the common-kind that are “persuasive or worth taking seriously [...] are those 
which appeal to scientifically established facts about perceptual and hallucinatory processes”100, 
Snowden’s response is to say that his project is a conceptual one.101 Just as we can claim that the 
causal theory of vision is false while claiming that causation is necessary for perception as a 
matter of fact, so can we claim that the disjunctive thesis is merely a conceptual truth, and not 
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true as a matter of fact. But Snowden is comparing apples to oranges. Disjunctivism, as Martin 
points out,
102
 is a type of error theory, where the disjunctivist is arguing that the concept of the 
‘common-kind’ is a philosophical fiction; the ‘common-kind’ has no value as a philosophical 
concept in general. I doubt Snowden wants to make a similar claim about causality. Although 
Snowden may be able to say that matters of facts about causality do not figure in our conceptual 
analysis of ‘causality’, he cannot say the same about the relationship between the disjunctive 
analysis and the ‘common-kind’. If the causal mechanisms necessary for perception give 
credence to the common-kind, as the weak-argument claims it does, claiming that your account 
is merely conceptual is insufficient as a response. If matters of fact contradict your conceptual 
scheme, perhaps a replacement is in order. 
 Langsam realizes the seriousness of the causal argument, and attempts to argue that the 
disjunctivist does not violate a wider version of SCP. Since perception is essentially relational, 
the same cause can have different effects without violating SCP. If I veridically perceive an 
apple, I am related to the actual object on Langsam’s account. If I hallucinate an apple, I am not 
related to any actual apple. Even though the good case and the bad case have the same proximate 
cause, they differ in their effects, as the good case has a relation to the object of perception.  
 However, if this response is sufficient to dispel the strong causal argument, it is 
conspicuously insufficient to dispel the weak causal argument. Even though relations between a 
subject and their environment are irreducible to the total-brain state of an individual, and even 
though this does not violate SCP, this is not the disjunctivist thesis; Langsam himself 
acknowledges that a relational account does not eliminate the common-kind.
103
 To respond to the 
weak argument, Langsam simply states that a positive account of hallucination will neither 
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violate SCP nor entail a common-kind.
104
 However, Langsam is begging the question against his 
opponent. All that is offered as a defense of his position is his assurance that the Theory of 
Appearing,
105
 the disjunctive thesis, and SCP must be correct, and so there must be a positive 
account of the ontology of hallucinations which satisfies these three positions. Unfortunately, 
insistence is not the most convincing form of argument. 
 The problem with the positive response to the weak causal argument is essentially the 
same problem faced by Langsam. If we want to offer a positive account of the bad case, then we 
ought to be able to offer some basic features that a hallucination must possess in order to answer 
the causal argument. This will involve postulating pairs of phenomenal properties. What follows 
are immediate questions posed to the positive disjunctivist: (i) How would we develop a positive 
notion of hallucinations if they do not share a common-kind? (ii) If positive disjunctivism is to 
deny SCP, can they? The answer to the first question is likely some form of conceptual analysis, 
though perhaps psychology or neuroscience will help provide an answer. However, even if 
further analysis were to reveal that there are pairs of phenomenal properties, why think that the 
two phenomenal pairs to do not share a common-kind? This is not to suggest that positive 
disjunctivism can be demonstrated to be false at this current time, but rather that the positive 
disjunctivist offers no reason to expect one outcome rather than the other. What we ask of the 
positive disjunctivist is to provide reasons for their position, and to provide a satisfactory 
response to the causal argument. Perhaps the positive disjunctivist can claim that the arguments 
for disjunctivism are sufficient to demonstrate its completeness, and problems of causality are 
anomalies which will be solved by future physicists and metaphysicians, but this is unlikely to 
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satisfy the opponent’s worries. What we need is an immediate reply to the causal argument; not 
procrastination on the matter. 
3.2 Martin, Negative Disjunctivism, and Indistinguishability 
"Properly understood, the disjunctive approach to perception is the appropriate starting 
point for any discussion of the nature of perceptual experience."
106
 
 
 Negative disjunctivists, the most notable being Martin and Hinton, believe that we cannot 
give a positive characterization of hallucinations. Instead, hallucinations are characterized in 
negative epistemological terms. After outlining Martin’s account of negative disjunctivism, a 
new strategy for answering the causal argument comes to the fore. 
 Imagine Langsam giving us an account of ‘indistinguishability’ between the veridical 
perception of an apple and its corresponding ‘perfect hallucination’ (one that has the same 
proximate cause). We can imagine him stating that veridical perception of the apple instantiates 
the phenomenal property of redness1, while the hallucination instantiates the phenomenal 
property of redness2. We could then continue this process for every property of the scene in 
question, and we would eventually end up with two indistinguishable, but entirely different, 
scenes: one that instantiates phenomenal properties1, present in the good case, and another that 
instantiates phenomenal properties2 in the bad case. We then might give the following definition 
of ‘indistinguishability’: two experiences are indistinguishable from one another if and only if 
they share identical properties1, identical properties2, or a combination of both identical 
properties1 and identical properties2. A talented painter may be able to paint two portraits that 
have the same properties E1, E2,..En, and one might not be able to distinguish between the two 
portraits. However, if the painter used one type of paint for the first picture, and another type for 
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the second, we might be justified in claiming that even though the two paintings are 
indistinguishable, they nonetheless are quite different in kind.
107
 
 The common-kind theorist endorses a similar conception of the ‘perfect hallucination’. A 
perfect hallucination is simply a mental event with properties E1, E2 , . .En, where properties E1, 
E2,..En  are the properties found in the corresponding veridical perception of the same scene.
108
 
This is because properties E1, E2,..En  are those properties which constitute the common-kind, and 
it is because the good case and the bad case have identical properties in virtue of being a 
veridical perception of a scene and a perfect hallucination of the scene; the perfect hallucination 
suitably brought about by the same neural processes that generate the veridical perception. 
 It is this way of defining ‘indistinguishability’ and ‘perfect hallucination’ that separates 
positive disjunctivists and common-kind theorists from negative disjunctivism. Rather, negative 
disjunctivism states that something is indistinguishable from event p if, upon reflection, we 
cannot tell event p from the veridical perception of p.
109
 This minimal conception of 
‘indistinguishability’ is compatible with the denial of the common-kind theorist’s conception of 
‘indistinguishability’, as it is possible that two events are indistinguishable for a subject, even if 
one event lacks some property the other possesses.
110
 Given this conception of 
‘indistinguishability’, a sensory experience of p simply is any experience of p that is 
indistinguishable from the veridical perception of p. This, according to Martin, is the proper 
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formulation of disjunctivism: a sense experience of p is either the veridical perception of p or the 
seemingly veridical perception of p.
111
 Nothing else need be said about the bad case. 
 If I have the sense experience as of seeing a bright light, whether or not my sense 
experience is veridical, it will be indistinguishable from the sense experience as of veridical 
perceiving of a bright light. Now, veridical perception consists of a relation between a person 
and their external environment, where the experience the person enjoys is constituted by an 
awareness of a mind-independent object. This thought is supported by the transparency or 
translucency of experience, where what we are aware of is the objects themselves; there is no 
introspectable aspect of our experience that suggests the awareness of an intermediary object of 
experience. The heart of the disjunctivist account is  to take this relation between a subject and 
their world to be explanatorily basic.
112
 If we want to understand the notion of ‘sense experience’ 
or ‘hallucination’, we must begin with ‘veridical perception’. A ‘sense experience’ is simply 
anything which is indistinguishable from the veridical perception of an object.
113
  
There are three basic sorts of 'indistinguishables', that is, indistinguishable from veridical 
perception--including of course veridical perception itself-- such that these indistinguishable 
experiences can all be characterized as sense experience: veridical perception, illusions, and 
hallucinations.
114
 Only veridical perception is an actual instance of veridical perception, while 
the latter two only seem like they are. Veridically perceiving a bright light requires that a bright 
light be present, and so is of a different kind than only seeming to veridically perceive a bright 
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light. To claim otherwise, that the good case and bad case share a common-kind, is to deny that 
veridical perception is explanatorily basic.  
 Of course, the common-kind theorist will reject this conception of ‘indistinguishability’ 
because a perfect hallucination must have properties E1, E2,..En, and so endorses a more 
substantive conception of ‘indistinguishability’. Furthermore, she will claim this 
indistinguishability is due to two mental events sharing the same proximate cause. 
‘Indistinguishability’ does not play a role simpliciter, but rather it is the properties of an event 
that determine whether two experiences are identical; specifically, two events are identical if 
they share the properties E1, E2,..En. More importantly, the common-kind theorist will find that 
the disjunctivist conception of ‘veridical perception’ is explanatorily redundant.115 How will 
declaring veridical perception as explanatorily basic add any explanatory value to an account of 
perception? Surely the common-kind will be able to perform a similar role, and if there is 
anything captured in the notion of ‘veridical perception’ which is absent in the notion of ‘an 
experience’, this will not be sufficient to show that veridical perception is different in kind from 
the bad case. As we saw in the last chapter, the moderate states that veridical perception consists 
of K and K*. 
 Negative disjunctivism answers these worries in two steps. First, it holds that the 
common-kind theorist carries more theoretical burdens, and therefore the burden of proof shifts 
to the common-kind theorist in their conception of ‘indistinguishability’. Second, the negative 
disjunctivist holds that since the bad case can only be characterized in negative epistemological 
terms, as seeming to be veridical, it is redundant to claim that the occurrence of the good case 
includes the occurrence of the bad case. Since we know veridical perception to be of the external 
world, and since we know that hallucinations can only be characterized as what it seems to be, 
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the bad case does not add anything to the experience. It is this line of thought which allows the 
disjunctivist to dispel the concerns brought about by the weak causal argument. 
 Let us consider Martin’s argument that the burden of proof rests with the common-kind 
theorist. Martin states that the common-kind theorist believes that the perfect hallucination, 
which is indistinguishable from the corresponding veridical perception, is indistinguishable in 
virtue of the two experiences sharing properties E1, E2,..En. However, Martin asks, “How could 
we ever show this to be true?” The one answer is that this follows from the two events having the 
same proximate cause, but this merely begs-the-question. Why think that two events which share 
the same proximate cause have identical properties? By accepting the moderate position, we 
already are willing to admit that relational properties play a non-causal role in perception. 
Furthermore, if the veridical perception is different in some respect from the perfect 
hallucination, why must it be exactly similar in its properties? To insist that it is exactly similar 
in its properties is to merely assert louder the common-kind assumption: they must be identical 
because the perfect hallucination will have the same properties (E1, E2,..En)  as the corresponding 
veridical perception. The moderate must either i) show that the weak causal argument defeats the 
disjunctivist, demonstrating that the negative disjunctivist analysis of ‘indistinguishability’ is 
insufficient or ii) they must find some other justification for their conception of 
‘indistinguishability’. 
 As we shall see, Martin believes that (i) is unavailable to the common-kind theorist. 
Instead, the common-kind theorist must show that one can justify her conception of 
‘indistinguishability’.116 But to do so would require the common-kind theorist to take on a 
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significant theoretical burden: potential infallibility about our mental states.
117
 This is so because 
the only way we could demonstrate that the perfect hallucination shares all the identical 
properties present in the corresponding veridical perception is by having an individual reflect on 
her experience. In order for this to be shown it would require a subject to correctly identify every 
property of a veridical perception, E1, E2,..En, and correctly identify every property of the 
corresponding hallucination, E1, E2,..En. But this is just to say that subjects can be infallible about 
the course of her experiences, and such an assumption is not only substantive, but likely false as 
well. For if the subject made any mistake about what occurred in her experience then she would 
not be describing the perfect hallucination, as to describe the perfect hallucination would require 
zero inaccuracies in the descriptions offered by the subject.
118
 
 Let us go back to our painter example. We can make perfect sense of two paintings being 
indistinguishable from each other in the way the common-kind theorist defines 
‘indistinguishability’. We could have a team of art historians, perhaps with the most advanced 
instruments available, approach two paintings and, over a significant period of time, come to the 
conclusion that the two paintings are indistinguishable; that both paintings share properties E1, 
E2,..En. They would identify every relevant property, and make sure that each painting has that 
property and no other relevant property. But how could we hope to carry out such a comparison 
between a scene and the perfect hallucination of that scene?  
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 Let us make this difficulty more apparent. A more fitting analogy would be a comparison 
between Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa and the perfect hallucination of the Mona Lisa. How 
could we determine if the hallucination has all the relevant properties possessed by the veridical 
perception of the Mona Lisa? I can imagine two ways of doing this. First, we would require that 
a neuroscientist be able to look at a person’s neural states and determine exactly what properties 
they are experiencing of the Mona Lisa. We could then expect that the neuroscientist be able to 
compare their empirical data with the Mona Lisa to verify if the person was truly having a 
perfect hallucination in the way the common-kind theorist expects them to. However, the 
possibility of a neuroscientist doing this requires significant philosophical assumptions, and it is 
incompatible with many forms of non-reductive physicalism. Simply put, for a neuroscientist to 
achieve this, hallucinations would need to be publically observable events and we would need to 
be able to identify those publically observable events with each and every property of the 
hallucination; E1, E2,..En. This empirical information could then be compared to the actual Mona 
Lisa.  
If this option is not open to us, then we are forced to concede that any verification of the 
common-kind theorist’s account of ‘indistinguishability’ will require a comparison between two 
different perspectives: the Mona Lisa, which is observable by anybody who can see the Mona 
Lisa, and the perfect hallucination of the Mona Lisa, which is only observable for the person 
hallucinating it. Let us then suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we could induce a perfect 
hallucination of the Mona Lisa in the world’s most renowned expert on the Mona Lisa, as an 
expert would be in the best position to distinguish the genuine masterpiece from a forgery. If the 
expert was to arrive at the conclusion that her perfect hallucination had the identical phenomenal 
properties as the true painting, it would require that she be infallible in discerning every relevant 
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phenomenal property of her hallucination. But, as previously stated, this is extremely dubious. 
Not only are experts fooled all the time by forgeries that are in fact different from the original, 
but people are notoriously fallible when it comes to their own mental states. Rather, the best case 
we have for a perfection hallucination of the Mona Lisa being ‘indistinguishable’ from the true 
Mona Lisa is whether an expert on the Mona Lisa finds the hallucination indiscriminable from 
the genuine article.
119
 
 Although the perfect forgery of the Mona Lisa requires that a team of experts be able to 
identify and compare every relevant property between the forgery and the genuine masterpiece, 
only to find that it is the perfect match, this does not hold for hallucinations and their 
corresponding scene. All we could hope for in the latter case is that a capable individual reflect 
on her hallucination and find it indiscernible. A hallucination possessing E1, E2,..En is sufficient 
for a hallucination to be indistinguishable from its corresponding scene, but it is not necessary. 
Instead, it is both sufficient and necessary that a subject not be able to discern a difference 
between the two. If we know that the common-kind theorist’s conception of the ‘perfect 
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 I am tempted to suggest that we can make more sense of Martin’s claim that the common-kind theorist is 
committed to the possibility of infallibility by taking note of Fred Dretske’s distinction between sensory experience 
and perceptual experience (I merely suggest this, as I am uncertain whether I can appropriate Dretske’s ideas 
without losing disjunctivism). According to Dretske, we can distinguish between sensation and perception by 
appealing to the claim that sensation exists in analog form, while perception is in digital form. Our sensory 
experience can be conceived ‘like a picture’ while perceptual experience involves classification, and pattern-
recognition. While our sense organs provide us with a vast amount of information in ‘pictorial form’, cognition 
involves disseminating that information. Furthermore, using Dretske’s language, information is always lost in the 
transition from the sensory experience/analog to the perception/digital. This then has the possibility to illuminate 
Martin’s previous claim. For a subject to be infallible in discriminating between a scene and its perfect 
hallucination requires that the subject be able to ‘convert all of one’s sensory experience into perceptual 
statements’. We know that this is not possible. Instead, for a subject to be unable to discriminate between a scene 
and its perfect hallucination all that is required is that the perceptual content is indistinguishable, as a subject 
would not be able to discriminate between two events in ‘analog form’; a subject can only compare perceptual 
experiences, not sensory experiences. Doesn’t our ordinary use of the word ‘indistinguishable’ reflect both 
Martin’s and Dretske’s theories? Something is indistinguishable if a person is unable to distinguish the two objects.  
If the common-kind theorist wants to claim that the common-kind is of the analog form, not the perceptual 
content, such that it is not possible for a subject to discern the common-kind, this does not solve the problem. 
How could we show that the perfect hallucination’s analog form matches the corresponding scene’s analog 
information? 
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hallucination’ can only ever be an assumption, unless they adopt the claim that it is possible that 
a subject be infallible about her own mental states, what reason could we have for adopting her 
conception of ‘indistinguishability’? 
 If the negative disjunctivist can show that the common-kind theorist is unjustified in her 
conceptual analysis of the ‘perfect hallucination’, the common-kind theorist can point to the type 
of hallucination that has the same proximate cause as its corresponding veridical perception to 
illuminate the common-kind conception of a ‘perfect hallucination’ i.e. she can invoke the weak 
causal argument. If K* has the same neural cause as K and K* is sufficient for an experience, 
then K and K* must share a common-kind. If the common-kind theorist were to admit that we 
could never have observational evidence that confirms her stronger conception of 
‘indistinguishability’, the weak-causal argument at least justifies an inference to the best 
explanation. Furthermore, although both the moderate and the disjunctivist may be charged with 
relying on action-at-a-distance, the moderate at least accepts some wider notion of SCP. The 
disjunctivist, if she cannot respond to the weak causal argument, seems to dismiss the principle 
altogether. 
 Martin’s response to the causal argument is that the perfect hallucination, at least for the 
negative disjunctivist, can only be described in negative epistemological terms. The perfect 
hallucination of a bright light is indiscriminable from the veridical perception of that bright light, 
try as the subject might. But this means we could only ever characterize the perfect hallucination 
of a bright light as being indistinguishable from the veridical perception of a bright light. All we 
can say of the perfect hallucination of a scene is that it seems like the veridical perception of that 
scene, and that the good case (veridical perception) and the bad case (hallucination) share the 
common property of being indistinguishable from the veridical perception of that scene. But is 
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the disjunctivist thereby committed to a common-kind, the common property of ‘being 
indistinguishable’ from the veridical perception of that scene? 
 This is referred to as the problem of screening-off. Martin does not want to deny 
experiential naturalism, and so must give some answer as to why K* does not occur in the good 
case. Note that Martin has good reasons to deny that a description of K is not made true in virtue 
of K*. For one, veridical perception acquaints us with the external world; hallucinations, 
infamously, do not. Veridical perception gives us direct access to the external world. If this is the 
case, as the transparency of experience suggests, then not only are cases of veridical perception 
indistinguishable from veridical perception, cases of veridical perception directly provide us 
access to the external world, preventing us from including K* in the good case. There might be 
some cases, such as a mugging on a foggy night, where I am unsure of whether or not my 
sensory experience was veridical or not. If I was not in doubt, it would not be the case that 
anything seemed veridical; for I would be in doubt only if my experience suggested that my 
experience might not be veridical.
120
 So either there was a mugger, and my experience was 
veridical, or there was no mugger, and my experience was delusive. Regardless of what truly did 
happen, in both cases it seems as if there is a mugger. But this does not happen in the vast 
majority of cases, because we have no reason to doubt that what we perceive is the external 
world. The vast majority of cases where the sensory experience of an event is characterized as 
seeming is when we are in doubt, and forced to give a disjunctive report; either I veridically 
perceive x or I seem to veridically perceive x.
121
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 Doubt of one’s perception can arise for a number of reasons, and not just reasons that arise from our reflection 
on our experience. One could perhaps be suspicious of there being pink ice cubes in one's drink, not because one 
reflects on the sensory experience of ice cubes, but because one's background information does not cohere with 
the presence of pink ice cubes. 
121
 I do not include all cases of hallucination because there may be cases where one is aware that one is 
experiencing the perfect hallucination, and so no doubt would be present. For instance, I might be involved in an 
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 If K* can only be described as if it were a K, the weak-causal argument would then 
suggest that K* is also present in K. The weak-causal argument, states the moderate, suggests 
that what is more basic than veridical perception is the property of ‘seeming to be a case of 
veridical perception’. The disjunctivist then is required to say one of two things: i) K has no 
explanatory role ii) K* does not play an explanatory role in the good case.
122
 To embrace (i) is to 
admit that transparency in experience is mere illusion. Most importantly, (i) loses the grounds 
which justified K* in the first place; K. We defined K* as ‘what is indistinguishable from K 
based on reflection’. But (i) suggests that K (a veridical perception of a scene) is 
indistinguishable from K* (indiscriminable from the veridical perception of a scene) because K* 
is present in both the good case and the bad case.  But K is the grounds by which we arrive at our 
definition of K*, and so K* would just be saying that K* is K* because it is K*.  
 Instead, the far more reasonable claim is (ii): that K* has no explanatory role in K. K is 
indistinguishable from K*, not because K* is a common-kind, but because K involves a relation 
with the world. We do not characterize veridically perceiving a bright light the way we do 
because it is indiscriminable from veridically perceiving a bright light, but because veridically 
perceiving a bright light allows us to make demonstrative judgements about them as well as 
allowing us to interact with the world. As Martin states: 
The notion common to perception and hallucination, that of sensory experience, lacks 
explanatory autonomy from that of veridical perception. And isn’t that just what we 
express by saying that either this is a case of veridical perception, in which case certain 
consequences follow, or it is merely one of being indiscriminable from such a 
perception, in virtue of which certain other consequences follow?
123
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
experiment where neuroscientists are interested in the experience of phosphenes. However, the hallucination 
would still be indistinguishable from the veridical perception based on reflection alone, and so does not provide a 
counter-example to the disjunctivist account. 
122
 Martin, “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, 299. 
123
 Ibid., 302. 
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By making veridical perception explanatorily basic, and by characterizing the perfect 
hallucination in negative epistemological terms (as it seeming to be something else), the weak-
causal argument does not pose any serious threat to the disjunctivist. 
 We now have a coherent response to the causal challenge and Martin can hold on to both 
experiential naturalism and naive realism while discarding the common-kind assumption. The 
following is a more concise version of Martin’s argument: 
1) The most that can be said of the perfect hallucination is that it is ‘indistinguishable’ 
from the veridical perception of the corresponding scene, where ‘indistinguishable’ simply 
means that a subject would be unable to discriminate, based on reflection alone, between 
the perfect hallucination and its corresponding scene. 
2) In instances where the hallucination has the same proximate cause as a veridical 
perception, what occurs is the perfect hallucination of the corresponding scene of veridical 
perception. 
3) If there was a common-kind in perception, it can be represented as K*, where K* is 
sufficient for a hallucination. In the perfect hallucination, K* can only be characterized in 
negative epistemological terms.  
4) Since all that can be said of the perfect hallucination is that it is indistinguishable from 
veridical perception, and since we have good reasons to claim that the veridical perception 
of a scene is indistinguishable from the veridical perception of that scene because it is an 
instance of veridical perception, instead of K* (a common-kind), there is no reason to think 
that veridical perception seems to be veridical perception in virtue of K*.  
Therefore (5) the weak-causal argument does not demonstrate the conceptual necessity of 
a common-kind. 
 
 We seem to have a potential solution to our problem. The next step in the process is to evaluate 
prima facie objections to Martin’s account. 
However, I wish to make two last remarks on this analysis of the weak-causal argument. 
The opponent may simply insist, even if Martin is correct in his analysis of ‘indistinguishability’, 
that it is utterly obvious that the same proximate cause produces the same phenomenal properties 
in the case of the perfect hallucination.
124
 But why should we be inclined to believe this? Martin 
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 Mark Johnston, in “The Obscure Object of Hallucination”, makes a similar move. After stating that perception 
does not supervene on the total-brain state of an individual, he assumes that because the perfect hallucination is 
indistinguishable from the corresponding veridical perception, the good case and the bad case have identical 
properties. Doesn't admitting that perception does not supervene on the total-brain state of an individual entail 
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can just claim that the same proximate cause produces indistinguishable sensory experiences, 
and we have no reason to endorse, not to mention reasons to reject, the claim that the perfect 
hallucination has identical phenomenal properties.
125
 Essentially, Martin is able to do this for two 
reasons. First, he defines ‘indistinguishability’ in negative epistemological terms. Second, in 
virtue of the first reason, Martin is not required to endorse the claim that the same proximate 
cause generates the same phenomenal features, for all that is required by ‘indistinguishability’ is 
that a subject be unable to distinguish between two events. To demand that the same proximate 
cause produces the same phenomenal effects is simply to endorse the common-kind thesis, as the 
common-kind is just those phenomenal features identical in the perfect hallucination. If the 
disjunctivist can answer the causal argument, what reason do they have to endorse the common-
kind thesis? If there are reasons to endorse the common-kind thesis, they are not supplied by the 
causal argument. All that follows from veridical perceptions and the perfect hallucination is that 
the same neural event can produce events that are indistinguishable, but indistinguishability 
especially understood through Martin’s account, does not entail nor demand the existence of a 
common-kind. 
 The second objection to Martin’s analysis is equally as simple. Can we make phenomenal 
properties themselves the common-kind?
126
 This is a complicated question, and requires 
significant attention. However, since naive realists are likely to identify the phenomenal 
properties with the external objects themselves, this objection is not terribly pressing. It is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the perception and hallucination will be different in some regard? For if they were identical, how could we 
claim that perception does not supervene on the total-brain state of an individual? This does not show the 
disjunctivist thesis to be true, but it leaves room open for us to claim that there is no prima facie reason to think 
that indistinguishability necessarily requires a common-kind. Johnston recognizes this difficulty, and attempts to 
give an account where the awareness of a hallucination is identical to the awareness of a perception.  
125
 Nor will neuroscience ever require that the perfect hallucination have a common-kind. Instead, neuroscience 
will manage just as well with Martin’s ‘indistinguishability’. William Fish argues for this point in his article 
“Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, 
Knowledge, ed. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
126
 Martin, “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, 310. 
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surprising that hallucinations have phenomenal properties, especially those phenomenal 
properties present with vision, and if phenomenal properties cannot be separated from the objects 
that possess them, the good and the bad case do not share a common-kind. The bad case is 
indistinguishable from the good case, and this will include phenomenal properties. 
 Looking back at the strong version of the causal argument, we found good reason to think 
that Robinson was wrong in his analysis of SCP. In our appeal to externalism, we found that the 
object of belief affects the content of the belief. Martin is making a similar move in appealing to 
naive realism and the transparency of experience. Why think that ‘phenomenal properties’ are 
identical even when the object of our experience, in the case of hallucinations, is entirely absent 
from our surroundings? With Martin, the fact that the good case and bad case are 
‘indistinguishable’ explains the similarity between the two, and to think otherwise is to go 
beyond the limits of our self-awareness.  
3.3 Objections to Martin’s Account 
 By stating that perfect hallucinations can only be characterized as being indistinguishable 
from the veridical perception of the same scene, two immediate questions arise: i) what about 
people or animals that are incapable of discerning between two events and ii) how can we 
characterize imperfect hallucinations? 
 The two main concerns of (i) are the following: the inattentive observer, and infants and 
animals.
127
 In the first case, we could imagine that a person experiences an imperfect 
hallucination, where perhaps there is a fairly obvious distinction between it and its corresponding 
veridical perception. According to our inattentive observer, there is no discernible difference 
between the good case and the bad case, despite their being obvious differences between the two. 
It appears that Martin would be committed to the view that perfect hallucinations are relative to 
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an observer; if the person takes it to be indiscriminable, then the experience is indiscriminable. 
This relative character is even more apparent in infants and animals. If infants and non-human 
animals are incapable of distinguishing between any two events, as they lack the cognitive ability 
to distinguish between two events in general, then we get the bizarre conclusion that every 
individual experience an animal enjoys is indiscriminable from the rest, implying that all of their 
experiences are of the same kind.
128
 Since a puppy lacks the cognitive mechanisms which allow 
for it to distinguish between the sensory experience of a bone and the sensory experience of a 
squirrel, the two events would meet Martin's criteria for an indistinguishable event. Either more 
needs to be said about ‘indistinguishability’ or the negative disjunctivist finds herself occupying 
an untenable position. 
 To account for these cases, the negative disjunctivist must give some account of 
‘indistinguishability’ that includes a particular idealized ability. In requiring the subject to 
exercise a certain ability in a certain way, we avoid the problems of inattentive observers, who 
are not sufficiently aware, and puppies, who lack the ability to distinguish whatsoever. Martin 
acknowledges the need for such an account
129
, and this project is taken up by Scott Sturgeon. 
However, whatever the ‘idealized ability’ amounts to, it cannot allow for a subject to be 
infallible when reporting their abilities. The ‘ability to discriminate’ cannot allow for a subject to 
identify E1, E2,..En in both the good and bad case, as this would undermine Martin’s overall 
account, for we would be conceding the common-kind theorist definition of ‘indistinguish-
ability’. If we are to define ‘indistinguishability’ in such a way that it avoids these problems, then 
we must describe how we ought to think of ‘indistinguishability’ and also supply substantial 
reasons for why the disjunctivist can make this impersonal move in the first place. Lastly, this 
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definition cannot be so impersonal and idealized that we arrive at the common-kind theorist’s 
definition of ‘indistinguishability’. 
 One such route is by appealing to a more general definition of ‘indistinguishability’ that 
reflects the disjunctivist conception. Fortunately, Timothy Williamson offers a general account 
of being ‘indiscriminable’, and thus is amenable to a disjunctivist analysis, as Scott Sturgeon and 
William Fish acknowledge.
130
 On Williamson’s account, according to Fish,131 something is 
indiscriminable for a subject if and only if at time t a subject is unable to discriminate between a 
and b.
132
 This is not to suggest that a criterion of indistinguishability is to apply to all objects at 
any time, but instead that this is the best we can hope for when dealing with private events 
(hallucinations).
133
 Martin suggests that the application of Williamson's account of 
indiscriminability is not simply ad hoc, but fundamental in understanding the nature of 
hallucinations and perception in general. 
 However, a question can be asked as to why we might think this idealization is possible 
in the first place? Since we are talking of subjects who are to discriminate, we may worry that 
the heart of Martin's account is lost by transforming particular subjects into a single, ideal 
subject. But since the perfect hallucination can only be described with negative epistemological 
statements, idealization is a perfectly acceptable move. Just as animals lack the ability to 
rationalize, this does not entail that ‘rationality’ is a chimera; that animals lack the ability to 
distinguish between their visual experiences does not entail that every experience they have is 
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 Sturgeon, 126. Sturgeon has arrived at this adapted form from Williamson's Identity and Discrimination, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990. 
131
 To be clear, we have a William and a Mr. Williamson, and a Fish and a Sturgeon.  
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 Fish, “Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination”, 146. 
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 Although objects of veridical perception are public, objects of hallucination are not because they do not exist as 
external objects, and this is my intended meaning in using the word ‘private’. 
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indistinguishable. For, as with many epistemological terms, ‘indistinguishability’ is idealized and 
impersonal.
134
 
 The more challenging project is to give a precise description of the idealized, impersonal 
subject. We may take our paradigm case to be a normally functioning, adult person, but it is 
unsure if this is the ideal we are looking for. Moreover, since normally functioning, adult persons 
possess slight variations in their abilities to discern between the good and the bad case, declaring 
that the paradigm case is the idealized, impersonal subject complicates matters further. Perhaps 
we are just not in a position to determine what the ideal case is, but all the disjunctivist needs is 
an ideal case that does not equate to being infallible about one’s experience. As philosophers, 
why would we even offer an ideal that we know cannot be achieved? When philosophy realized 
that defining ‘knowledge’ as ‘infallible belief’ was an unfeasible project, our response was not to 
admit that knowledge is impossible, but rather that knowledge is something other than ‘an 
infallible belief’. If philosophers demand that the ‘perfect hallucination’ requires that we be 
infallible about own experience, perhaps, as do Hinton and Martin, we ought to reconsider our 
demands. 
 If we can reasonably assert that infants and animals pose no problem for Martin’s 
account, what can we say of hallucinations which are imperfect? What does an imperfect 
hallucination amount to? Strictly speaking, Martin’s account allows for three types of 
hallucinations, each posing its own problem.
135
 The first is the focus of his analysis; the perfect 
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 There may be a fourth type of hallucination: the imperfect hallucination of an impossible event. This is unlikely 
however, due to Martin’s conception of ‘indistinguishability’. Since there is no such thing as the veridical 
perception of an impossible event, ‘indistinguishability’ has no grounding that comes from veridically perceiving 
the impossible event. Thus, there is no veridical reference to determine if a subject can discriminate between it 
and a perfect hallucination. There is no such thing as a perfect or imperfect impossible hallucination. There is a 
difference between hallucinating a M.C. Escher type drawing and hallucinating a M.C. Escher type situation, as the 
former is ‘possible’, the later, ‘impossible’. 
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hallucination. The second is the imperfect hallucination: a hallucination that is not 
indiscriminable from the veridical perception of that event. The third is a hallucination of an 
impossible event. This includes impossible scenarios, such as those found in M.C. Esher 
drawings,
136
 and special hallucinatory experiences, such as Mark Johnston’s supersaturated ‘red’; 
a colour of ‘red’ that is only perceptible to hallucinating subjects in special conditions.137 Since, 
according to Martin, an event is a sensory experience if it is indiscriminable from its 
corresponding veridical perception, these imperfect instances of hallucination do not meet the 
definition of a sensory experience. 
 Martin momentarily dodges this criticism by stating that he is concerned with ‘perfect 
hallucinations’ and so is not discussing imperfect hallucinations. All we can say of a ‘perfect 
hallucination’ is that it is indiscriminable from the veridical perception of that scene, and this is 
sufficient to answer the causal argument. This may be true, but Martin is leaving his view open 
to attack, for if we remain mute on imperfect and impossible hallucinations, there is a worry that 
the opponent shall find a common-kind between veridical perception and imperfect 
hallucinations or impossible hallucinations. The reason for describing perfect hallucinations in 
negative epistemological terms is because they are indistinguishable from the corresponding 
veridical perception. This suggests that imperfect and impossible hallucinations can be given a 
positive description. This conclusion is not immediately worrying, as the causal argument does 
not involve imperfect and impossible hallucinations. However, this then requires a response to 
the indistinguishability argument against disjunctivism, as Martin has to offer an account of 
‘indistinguishability’ in general; an account which includes imperfect and impossible situations, 
or at least an account which says something about them. This is not to say that Martin cannot 
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 Mark Johnston, “The Obscure Object of Hallucination” in Disjunctivism, ed. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue 
(London, The MIT Press, 2009), 222. 
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offer such a theory, but rather that a more detailed story is required before our worries can be put 
to rest. 
 There are others aspects of Martin’s account which requires clarification or revision, 
most notably some key terms in the theory; background assumptions, reflection, and 
indiscriminability.
138
 However, Martin still offers a promising account of ‘indistinguishability’ 
which provides a response to the weak-causal argument. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Being citizens of the 21
st
 century we will likely witness huge leaps in the field of 
neuropsychology, and our understanding of the relationship between persons and their grey-
matter will provide numerous insights about our species; the study of the brain will be important 
for our ideas of how perception works. The broadest aim of this project then was to inspect the 
possibility of reconciling this historical trend with the philosophical thesis of naive realism. By 
characterizing the right side of disjunctive reports solely in epistemologically negative terms, this 
reconciliation is made possible. Although there is still much to be desired in terms of details, 
Martin’s conception of ‘indistinguishability’ provides an adequate defense of the disjunctivist, 
and therefore naive realist, account of perception. However, the truth of disjunctivism does not 
necessarily entail the truth of naive realism. Naive realism must also make a case for itself on its 
own terms, albeit with the disjunctive conception of experience in order to address some of the 
problems of perception.  
 In answering the strong version of the causal argument, I claimed that the argument is 
persuasive in-so-far as we accept Robinson’s description of SCP. However, such a narrow 
construal entails that our psychological lives would supervene only on the total-brain state of an 
individual, a position many would consider to have been refuted (including the disjunctivist and 
the moderate). Therefore, by modus tollens, the narrow version of SCP is false. However, the 
consequence of denying the narrow version of SCP and whether this entails action-at-a-distance 
is, at the moment, unclear. This leads us to another question: Where does disjunctivism ‘fit’ with 
regards to other theories within the philosophy of mind? For instance, in affirming that veridical 
perceptions and hallucinations are ontologically distinct, is disjunctivism incompatible with 
certain versions of the psychophysical identity theory? Thus, the metaphysical issues at play, 
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with regards to causality and the mind, have not been sufficiently answered. Nonetheless, the 
primary metaphysical principle for our concerns, the SCP, can be dismissed.   
 The weak-causal argument, on the other hand, is sufficient for dismissing positive 
disjunctivism. Simply put, positive disjunctivism cannot offer us assurance that descriptions of 
hallucinations will not uncover a common-kind between the good case and the bad case. 
Negative disjunctivism greatly improves on this by both clarifying the disjunctivist position and 
through limiting what it is we can know about our hallucinations. What is needed then is to apply 
Martin’s conception of ‘indistinguishability’ to other cases, such as instances of ‘imperfect 
hallucinations’ and illusions, in order to better evaluate how applicable the conception is. 
 I take it that the primary feature of disjunctivism ultimately provides an answer to the 
causal argument; veridical perception is explanatorily basic. If this is the case, the philosopher 
cannot offer something lower in order to formulate a common-kind without, at the same time, 
undermining the primacy of veridical perception.  
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